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American Toxic Tort Law: An Historical
Background, 1979-87
Robert F. Blomquist*
American toxic tort law began in earnest in late 1979
when United States District Court Judge George Pratt wrote
the first published judicial opinion in what would later be-
come a deluge of further opinions in In re Agent Orange
Products Liability Litigation.1 While various reported tort
opinions involving potentially dangerous chemical substances
antedated the Agent Orange opinion by several years,2 signifi-
cant pollution control statutes had existed since the 1950s,5
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law, B.S., Economics, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania (1973); J.D., Cornell Law School (1977).
1. 506 F. Supp. 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
2. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (asbestos); Tinnerholm v. Parke Davis & Co., 285 F.
Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd on other grounds, 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969)
(pharmaceuticals); Drayton v. Gaffe Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D. Ohio
1975), aff'd on other grounds, 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978) (liquid drain cleaner);
Para Creek Cranberry Corp. v. Hopkins Agr. Chem. Co., 139 N.W.2d 96 (Wis. 1966)
(pesticides); Sinclair Prarie Oil Co. v. Stell, 124 P.2d 255 (Okla. 1942) (oil wastes);
Lartique v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
865 (1963) (cigarette smoke); Mahoney v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 823 (E.D.
Tenn. 1963), affd, 339 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1964) (radioactive material and gases); Gar-
ner v. Hecla Mining Co., 431 P.2d 794 (Utah 1967) (uranium); Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil,
Inc., 369 A.2d 49 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976) (oil); Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 121
N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1954) (groundwater pollution by gasoline).
3. See Developments in the Law - Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARv. L. REV.
1458 (1986) [hereinafter "Developments in the Law"]:
1
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and scattered scholarly commentary had already been estab-
lished concerning potential legal remedies for redressing dam-
ages from pollution and human exposure to harmful sub-
stances,4  the 1979 Agent Orange opinion marked an
important intellectual 5 landmark. Judge Pratt's decision
presented the first time that an American court, in a pub-
lished opinion, used the term of art "toxic torts" to describe
what factual and legal issues were at stake. In the decision's
aftermath, the phrases "toxic tort" and "toxic torts" prolifer-
ated - in judicial decisions, legislation, scholarly analyses,
and press reports.
The most notable of the federal pollution control statutes passed in the 1950s
was the Clean Air Act in 1955, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982)). During the 1960s, this statute
was amended by the Clean Air Act [of] 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat.
392; the National Emissions Standards Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79
Stat. 992; the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 98-675, 80
Stat. 954; and the Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485.
Federal water pollution statutes of the 1960s included the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control (Clean Water) Act Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-624,
74 Stat. 411; 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88, 75 Stat. 204; 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234,
79 Stat. 903; and 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246. These statutes were
superseded by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1376 (1982)).
Id. at 1469 n.17.
4. See, e.g., Note, Rights and Remedies in the Law of Stream Pollution, 35 VA.
L. REV. 774 (1949); Note, Stream Pollution - Recovery of Damages, 50 IOWA L. REV.
141 (1964); Note, A Survey of Common Law Remedies for Stream Pollution in New
York, 10 BUFF. L. REV. 484 (1961).
5. Intellectual origins of legal concepts provide fruitful subjects of inquiry. See,
e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1980);
George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985); Robert
F. Blomquist, "Clean New World": Toward an Intellectual History of American En-
vironmental Law, 1961-1990, 25 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (1990).
6. I have explored, elsewhere, the use of another "signal" or "marker" phrase in
common law tort opinions. See Robert F. Blomquist, "New Torts": A Critical His-
tory, Taxonomy, and Appraisal, 95 DICK. L. REv. 23 (1990). While "the words have
meant different things.., in different contexts," I concluded that "[tihe phrase 'new
tort' appears to be a signal, or marker, for addressing the ramifications and implica-
tions of judicial creativity in responding to cases that seek to change existing tort
doctrine" and, "[als such ... ha[d] become a tool of jurisprudential analysis: 'a form
of law . . . seen as a complex of means and goals'." Id. at 36-37 (citing ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 71 (1982)).
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss1/6
TOXIC TORT LAW: 1979-87
With this seminal opinion and certain related Agent Or-
ange litigation opinions, I begin my historical sketch of Amer-
ican toxic tort law in Part I of the article. Part II describes
the complex litigation in Allen v. United States, which in-
volved exposure by hundreds of people to radioactive fallout
released during atomic weapons testing by the U.S. military in
the American Southwest.8 Part III analyzes the variety, scope,
and subtleties of toxic tort actions against the asbestos indus-
try.9 In Part IV, I shift perspective from specific types of toxic
substance cases to the conceptual category of toxic substance
environmental exposure cases. 10 This functional approach is
continued in Part V of the article, with a review of miscellane-
ous cases involving occupational exposure to harmful sub-
stances," and in Part VI with a discussion of assorted key
product liability litigation involving toxic materials.1 2 Finally,
my historical primer ends with Part VII - a brief considera-
tion of some insurance issues in toxic tort cases during the
relevant time period."3
In order to explore specific cases where courts have en-
countered, and interpreted, the concept of a "toxic tort," I
have concentrated my essay on those decisions expressly
utilizing that phrase (in the singular or plural).
I. The Agent Orange Opinions
A. Judge Pratt's Decision to Apply Federal Common Law to
Veterans' Toxic Tort Claims
In the plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to dismissal
motions brought by various chemical company defendants,
who had allegedly manufactured a defoliant, euphemistically
referred to as "Agent Orange," the issues to be considered
were poignantly framed:
7. See infra notes 14-146 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 147-79 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 180-277 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 278-391 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 392-425 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 426-43 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 444-52 and accompanying text.
1992]
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How are soldiers of the United States to be compensated
for toxic torts inflicted by multi-national conglomerate
corporations? How are principles of "fitness" and
"safety" to be applied to the paraphernalia of the battle-
field? In the absence of statutory direction, how are the
policies enunciated in federal pesticide and toxic sub-
stances legislation to be effectuated? 14
In answering these questions, Judge George C. Pratt
ruled that federal question subject matter jurisdiction existed
because of the need for the court to apply federal common law
to mass tort claims brought by an assortment of Vietnam vet-
erans and their families for injuries allegedly caused by the
United States military's use of Agent Orange in Vietnam. The
court considered three analytical factors in deciding whether
to allow the common law tort theories to proceed 5 further,
pursuant to a uniform federal approach: "(1) the existence of
a substantial federal interest in the outcome of [the] litiga-
tion; (2) the effect on this federal interest should state law be
applied; and (3) the effect on state interests should state law
be displaced by federal common law."16 Applying these con-
siderations, the court found significant federal interests at
stake in the litigation: "the rights of soldiers to be protected
from 'harms inflicted by others' and to be compensated for
harms already inflicted,"17 and potentially "broad questions
about the conduct of military operations" due to the "unprec-
14. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. [hereinafter A.O.], 506 F. Supp. 737,
743 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128
(1981) (quoting plaintiffs' memorandum at 15).
15. Plaintiffs' claims in the third amended complaint alleged implied statutory
causes of action arising under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA), §§ 2-13, 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k (1988) (omitted and amended by 7 U.S.C. §
136); the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act (FEPCA), § 2, 7 U.S.C. §§
136-136y (Supp. 1992); the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), §§ 2 - 2-309, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2601 - 2671 (Supp. 1992); and the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA),
§§ 2 - 34, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051 - 2083 (1988) were dismissed since they failed, under the
court's analysis, to meet the test for implying a private cause of action under a fed-
eral statute as established by the Supreme Court in Court v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
A.O. 506 F. Supp. at 741-42, 749.
16. 506 F. Supp. at 746.
17. Id. at 747 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305-06
(1947)).
[Vol. 10
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edented number and size of the claims" at bar."8 Moreover,
Judge Pratt concluded that if the lawsuit were governed by
state law, instead of a uniform federal common law tort ap-
proach, "different state laws would be applied to essentially
similar claims by Vietnam veterans and their families against
the five defendant war contractors." 19 The court found such a
prospect undesirable because of the legal uncertainty that
would exist for both war veterans and contractors, and the un-
fairness of according different legal treatment to litigants who,
in all relevant respects, had similar claims.2 0 Finally, the court
assessed the impact of state interests should state law be dis-
placed by federal common law. Judge Pratt concluded that
this impact would be slight on balance, because state tort law
had not yet evolved rules to govern war contractor liability,
and the use of the toxic chemicals at issue in the litigation was
subject to widespread federal standards under comprehensive
federal legislation.21
B. Judge Pratt's Preliminary Procedural Rulings
With the advent of the new decade of the 1980s, Judge
Pratt faced a deluge of pretrial motions by the plaintiffs, the
chemical company defendants, and the United States govern-
ment. In a series of crisp and proactive decisions, the court
made the following significant procedural rulings: that not-
withstanding the federal government's document destruction
policy and the general stay of discovery in the case, the "Vet-
erans Administration and other departments and agencies
18. Id. at 748 n.6.
19. Id. at 748. The plaintiffs sought relief under a variety of traditional tort theo-
ries: negligence, strict product liability, "breach of warranty, intentional tort, equity,
and nuisance." Id. at n.8. Yet, the court crafted federal common law for only negli-
gence and strict product liability because it concluded that at the early point in the
litigation, "it [was] unnecessary to decide whether the other claims should be gov-
erned by federal common law, or rather should be treated as pendent state law
claims." Id.
20. As noted in the opinion: "An extreme example would be the application of
different state statutes of limitation to claims by veterans who were injured together
in Vietnam but who lived in different states before or after service." Id. at 748.
21. Id. at 749.
19921
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likely to have relevant records '22 should preserve records
linked to the claims in the litigation; that one of the plaintiffs'
videotaped deposition should proceed as scheduled with possi-
ble limitations on its use at trial;23 that special problems and
issues resulting from the claims by Australian veterans should
be resolved at a pretrial conference; 24 and, in light of the juris-
dictional nature of the written notice requirement of the Fed-
eral Torts Claim Act, the 2.4 million veterans (and members
of their families) who were potential plaintiffs against the U.S.
government would be required to file separate forms with the
government.2 5 Significantly, in deciding the latter issue, the
court expressed frustration with procedures that were poorly
adapted to the unique nature of the Agent Orange
controversy:
It is apparent that the notice of claim procedures and re-
quirements are neither designed for nor well adapted to a
situation like the case at bar for many reasons: the large
number of claimants possible here, the uncertain scien-
tific basis for the potential claims, the difficulty of deter-
mining the presence and nature of injuries alleged, the
uncertainty of knowing whether federal or state law prin-
ciples will apply, and the often misleading media atten-
tion given to the scope of this action and the protection
afforded potential claimants in this court.26
Despite Judge Pratt's frustration with existing tort claim
procedures, he asserted lack of judicial authority to change
the rules. He opined that:
However poorly adapted the procedures may be, the court
is bound by the statutory requirements for administrative
review and is without authority to order the alternative
procedures suggested by plaintiffs. Were the court em-
powered to rewrite the statute to suit the unusual circum-
22. A.O., 506 F. Supp. 750, 751 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
23. A.O., 506 F. Supp. 754 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
24. A.O., 506 F. Supp. 756, 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
25. A.O., 506 F. Supp. 757, 760 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)).
26. Id. at 761.
[Vol. 10
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stances here presented, the court might provide for a sim-
plified procedure which would permit the filing of a single
notice of claim in satisfaction of the administrative notice
requirement for the claims of all potential plaintiffs
against the government. But the court is not so empow-
ered, and plaintiffs are thereby left to address their equi-
table arguments to Congress, the source of the burden-
some requirements . . .
C. Interlocutory Reversal by the Second Circuit: Diversity is
the Sole Basis for Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In late November 1980, a panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, by a vote of two to
one, reversed Judge Pratt's 1979 decision to apply federal
common law to the case.2 8 Writing for the panel in a terse
opinion, Judge Amalya Kearse held that there was no "identi-
fiable federal policy at stake in this litigation that warrants
the creation of federal common law rules. ' 29 Accordingly, this
reversal meant that the federal district court could hear the
litigation solely on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Given
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,30 this meant that assorted
state substantive law rules, such as statutes of limitations and
product liability rules, would need to be ascertained and ap-
plied by the trial court.
As discussed by Professor Peter Schuck, the Second Cir-
cuit decision represents
a classic example of the perils of treating [a toxic tort dis-
pute like] Agent Orange as a larger version of a conven-
tional tort dispute. [This] approach, perfectly defensible
in the ordinary case in which one or a few soldiers sue
concerning a discrete incident, made no sense at all in a
mass action going to the heart of a broad federal policy."
27. Id.
28. A.O., 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
29. Id. at 993.
30. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
31. PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE
1992]
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D. Judie Pratt's December 1980 Dispositive, Declaratory
and Case Management Rulings
In late December 1980, five weeks after the Second Cir-
cuit's interlocutory order of reversal, Judge Pratt made an im-
portant dispositive ruling which dismissed all claims against
the United States government. Moreover, his decision also
held that while the chemical company defendants could assert
a government contractor defense - a shielding of private ac-
tions pursuant to governmental sovereign immunity - they
still had to prove the necessary factual predicates of the de-
fense in order to escape liability from plaintiffs' tort claims.
Finally, Judge Pratt's decision also articulated a comprehen-
sive case management plan to govern the further proceedings
in the case.
Judge Pratt's "decision was momentous, profoundly shap-
ing the subsequent course of the litigation. 3 2 In the course of
dismissing all claims against the United States government,
he emphasized the importance of a 1950 U.S. Supreme Court
case, Feres v. United States,ss in construing the Federal Tort
Claims Act 4 as not waiving sovereign immunity "with respect
to claims of servicemen ... arising out of their military ser-
vice."35 As part of his analysis, Judge Pratt also noted that
"[a]ny doubt as to the validity of the Feres doctrine was laid
to rest"" in the 1977 case, Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v.
United States,3 7 which extended Feres "to third party claims
against the government," similar to the chemical companies
claims in the Agent Orange litigation. Accordingly, the court
ruled that "[t]he Feres/Stencel doctrine bars defendants' at-
COURTS 67 (1986). Indeed, as Chief Judge Wilfred Feinberg noted in his dissenting
opinion, there was no defensible distinction between existing-Second Circuit prece-
dent that emphasized the important federal interests in assuring uniform legal treat-
ment of federal prisoners and the Agent Orange litigation. A.O., 635 F.2d at 998
(Feinberg, dissenting).
32. SCHUCK, supra note 31, at 67.
33. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
34. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 (Supp. 1992).
35. 506 F. Supp. at 770.
36. Id. at 771.
37. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
38. 506 F. Supp. at 771 (citing 431 U.S. 666 (1977)).
[Vol. 10
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tempt to seek contribution or indemnity from the United
States based on any recovery plaintiffs may obtain for injuries
that arose out of or were suffered incident to service."39 Since
Judge Pratt concluded that the "incident to military service"
standard was to be broadly construed, he held that
"[w]hatever the facts surrounding a particular veteran's claim
of exposure may be, each veteran's presence in southeast Asia
resulted solely from [his] military service,"' 0 whether or not
exposure to Agent Orange occurred while on duty or off
duty."1 This expansive statutory and doctrinal interpretation
also led the court to bar contribution suits against the United
States by the chemical companies for damages paid to mili-
tary members' relatives and offspring."2 The court also consid-
ered the government contractor defense raised by the chemi-
cal companies which sought to "avoid manufacturer liability
on the ground that the circumstances surrounding Agent Or-
ange's manufacture and use were controlled and dictated by
the United States government acting in a capacity in which
the government is protected from liability by sovereign immu-
nity and the Feres/Stencel doctrine.'4 3 While recognizing the
theoretical validity of this defense, the court denied the chem-
ical companies' summary judgment motion, concluding the
resolution of several factual issues by separate trial was neces-
sary to "determine whether defendants have a complete de-
fense to the claims asserted against them.""
Perhaps the most significant part of this opinion, from
the standpoint of toxic tort jurisprudence, was Judge Pratt's
''case management plan." The plan contained four principal
parts: (1) a certification of the case as a class action under
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); (2) scheduling for decision of the issue
39. Id. at 774.
40. Id. at 776 (footnote omitted).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 780-81. Upon reconsideration several years later, the government's mo-
tion to dismiss defendants' third party complaints was granted only as to claims
made by the veterans and the derivative claims of their family members. The govern-
ment's motion to dismiss was denied insofar as it related to the independent claims of
the veterans' wives and children. A.O., 580 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
43. Id. at 792.
44. Id. at 796.
1992]
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of the various applicable state statutes of limitations now gov-
erning the dispute in light of the Second Circuit's interlocu-
tory reversal; (3) directing a series of trials, in logical se-
quence, with respect to issues in common with the class; and
(4) ordering limited discovery focused on the government con-
tractor defense.' 5 Significantly, Judge Pratt discerned a series
of novel characteristics of the Agent Orange case that indi-
cated his appreciation that a toxic tort dispute was not a mere
conventional tort case."' These unique characteristics included
the following exhaustive taxonomy, worthy of full quotation:
1. There are a large number of plaintiffs and potential
plaintiffs who claim to have been injured by exposure to
Agent Orange... There are now approximately 167 suits
pending in the Eastern District of New York involving
over 3,400 plaintiffs. The court has been informed that
there are many thousands more who have, at the court's
request and pending decision of the class action motion,
refrained from bringing individual actions.
2. There are numerous chemical companies named as de-
fendants. The fact that they may have had differing de-
grees of involvement in manufacturing and supplying
Agent Orange for the government may or may not cause
differing levels of responsibility for the effects of Agent
Orange on plaintiffs.
3. Present plaintiffs come from most of the 50 states and
from Australia. This may require consideration of varying
standards of conduct, rules of causation and principles of
damages that may substantially affect the results in indi-
vidual cases.
4. The causation issues are difficult and complex. Clearly
this is not the "simple" type of "disaster" litigation such
as an airplane crash involving a single incident, having a
causation picture that is readily grasped through conven-
tional litigation techniques and presenting comparatively
small variations among the claimants as to the effects'
upon them of the crash. With the Agent Orange litigation,
45. 506 F. Supp. at 785-86. See generally, id. at 787-92, 796-98 (providing in
depth detail of the court's reasoning regarding the case management plan).
46. But cf. SCHUCK, supra note 31, at 68.
[Vol. 10
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injuries are claimed to have resulted from exposure to a
chemical that was disseminated in the air over southeast
Asia during a period of several years. Each veteran was
exposed differently, although undoubtedly patterns of ex-
posure will emerge. The claimed injuries vary signifi-
cantly. Moreover, there is a major dispute over whether
Agent Orange can cause the injuries in question, and
there are separate disputes over whether the exposure
claimed in each case did cause the injuries claimed. The
picture is further complicated by the use in Vietnam of
other chemicals and drugs that also claim to be capable of
causing many of the injuries attributed to Agent Orange.
5. The litigation presents numerous questions of law that
lie at the frontier of modern tort jurisprudence. Among
them are questions of enterprise liability, strict products
liability, liability for injuries that appear long after origi-
nal exposure to the offending substance, and liability for
so-called genetic injuries.
6. Many of the people exposed to Agent Orange may not
even yet have experienced the harm it may cause.
7. Numerous scientific and medical issues are presented,
and there are serious questions of whether there is ade-
quate data to reach scientifically sound conclusions about
them. There is the further question of whether legally
permissible conclusions may nevertheless be reached on
data that would not permit "scientific" conclusions.
8. Various agencies of the government have expressed
concern but as yet have shown little tangible action about
the problems claimed to have been caused by the govern-
ment's use of Agent Orange.
9. There are important and conflicting public policies that
run as crosscurrents through many phases of both the
substantive and procedural problems of this litigation.
10. There is a wide choice available among the many pro-
cedural devices that could be used for addressing and ul-
timately deciding this controversy.'
Judge Pratt also commented on the human drama of the
case by observing:
47. 506 F. Supp. at 783-84.
1992]
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All of these problems are compounded by the practi-
cal realities of having on one side of the litigation plain-
tiffs who seek damages, but who have limited resources
with which to press their claims and whose plight be-
comes more desperate and depressing as time goes on,
and having on the other side defendants who strenuously
contest their liability, who have ample resources for coun-
sel and expert witnesses to defend them, and who proba-
bly gain significantly, although immeasurably, from every
delay that they can produce.
Overarching the entire dispute is a feeling on both
sides that whatever existing law and procedures may
technically require, fairness, justice and equity in this un-
precedented controversy demand that the government as-
sume responsibility for the harm caused our soldiers and
their families by its use of Agent Orange in southeast
Asia. 8
While a variety of opinions in the Agent Orange litigation
followed Judge Pratt's December 1980 decision,"' the next sig-
nificant opinion in the case from the standpoint of toxic tort
jurisprudence was rendered nearly four years later by U.S.
District Court Judge Jack Weinstein in a September 1984 rul-
ing on a motion for approval of a proposed settlement
agreement50
E. Judge Weinstein's September 1984 Decision Upholding
the Fairness of the 180 Million Dollar Settlement
Echoing the twin themes of emotional appeal and factual
complexity earlier recognized by Judge Pratt, Judge Wein-
stein, in a 158-page published opinion (including appendices),
approved the fairness of a $180 million settlement between
the plaintiffs' class and the chemical companies. The court
48. Id. at 784.
49. See A.O., 597 F. Supp. 740, 876-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d
Cir. 1987) (citing published opinions in Agent Orange litigation from 1979 commence-
ment through September 1984 Fairness Opinion).
50. Id. For an interesting description of Judge Weinstein's entry into the case in
October 1983, the scheduled trial dates in May 1984, and the judge's role in bringing
about the settlement, see SCHUCK, supra note 31, at 111-67.
[Vol. 10
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noted that while "many legal issues [in the case] are unique
and the factual issues unresolved by the scientific communi-
ties addressing them," it was "the deeply charged emotions
that surround and engulf the litigation" ' 1 that created great
difficulty in assessing the fairness of the settlement. Indeed,
Judge Weinstein recounted his unique experience in "listening
to hundreds of witnesses around the country and reading the
poignant letters of many veterans, their wives and parents,"
making it clear to the court "that more than money [was] at
stake '52 in the lawsuit.
The Agent Orange Fairness Opinion accepted the pro-
posed $180 million class settlement for three basic reasons. In
Judge Weinstein's view, "[iut gives the class more than it
would likely achieve by attempting to litigate to the death. It
provides funds to help at least some men, women and children
whose hardships will be reduced in some small degree. It [fi-
nally] does represent a major step in the essential process of
reconciliation among ourselves."53
The core of the court's opinion dealt with the numerous
factual and legal problems that would have to be overcome if
the plaintiffs were to press their claims to trial. With regard
to the plaintiffs' factual claims, Judge Weinstein observed
that "at best the evidence is inconclusive. This is due in part
to the difficulty of proof in any mass toxic tort litigation and
in part to the weakness in proof of the causal relationship""
in the available studies and data. This weakness in factual
proof was particularly striking where so much legal and judi-
cial resources had already been expended in the case. As
noted by Judge Weinstein:
This has been one of the most complex litigations
ever brought. Some 600 separate cases have been sent to
this district from all over the country with an estimated
fifteen thousand named plaintiffs. Millions of pages of
documents and hundreds of depositions of witnesses have
51. A.O., 597 F. Supp. at 746.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 747.
54. Id.
1992]
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been collected. The docket sheet of this court has some
4,000 separate entries respecting these related cases. Hun-
dreds of motions have been heard and hundreds of oral
directions given by the court, special masters and magis-
trate in the course of preparing the case for trial. The
court, magistrate and special masters have held meetings
with counsel from all over the country on an almost daily
basis. Hundreds of scientists, government personnel, pri-
vate executives, lawyers and others have devoted a great
deal of time to this litigation. It is unlikely that further
expenditure of time and money will be productive. It is
time to bring this dispute to a close.55
The court characterized plaintiffs' factual theory of cau-
sation as being fraught with "logical and practical diffi-
culty."" On the one hand, plaintiffs argued that: "Agent Or-
ange contained small quantities of dioxin. Dioxin is a potent
poison which can cause serious harm to humans. Many plain-
tiffs suffer from diseases that can be caused by dioxin. Dioxin
caused the disease." However, as pointed out by the court,
"the diseases referred to may result from causes other than
dioxin poisoning. '57
Later in the opinion, the court analyzed the plaintiffs'
causation problems in a more extensive legal discussion. Di-
viding the causation problem into two component parts,
Judge Weinstein observed that the plaintiffs faced the dual
problem of the "[i]ndeterminate [d]efendant"" as well as the
"[i]ndeterminate [p]laintiff."" In describing the former, the
Agent Orange Fairness Opinion asserts that the "case illus-
trates the inapplicability of burden of proof rules designed for
simple two-party cases to mass toxic torts where injury was
allegedly caused, but the question of which manufacturer cre-
ated the harm cannot be answered with precision." 60 To alle-
viate the problem of impossibility as to the identification of
55. Id. at 749-50.
56. Id. at 777.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 819.
59. Id. at 833.
60. Id. at 819.
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specific chemical manufacturers, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs would be able to establish a type of enterprise liabil-
ity by showing that each manufacturer's failure to warn was
the legal cause of the plaintiffs' injuries even though the
cause-in-fact of a particular injury may have been chemicals
produced by another manufacturer."
Moreover, Judge Weinstein concluded that notwithstand-
ing a liberalized causation rule, "[iut is likely, however, that
even if plaintiffs as a class could prove that they were injured
by Agent Orange, [and thereby were able to overcome the in-
determinate defendant problem] no individual class member
would be able to prove that his or her injuries were caused by
Agent Orange."62 In light of this, latter, indeterminate plain-
tiff problem, the court drew analogies to employment discrim-
ination cases and consumer class actions, and determined that
"a form of proportional liability" based on statistical risk en-
hancement was appropriate." In the course of crafting these
innovative causation rules, however, the court candidly ac-
knowledged that:
[t]he vexing problems of toxic torts probably would
be best dealt with by legislation. In the absence of legisla-
tive and executive action courts must attempt to devise
the most effective and equitable means of dealing with
them through approaches that are consonant with present
law and reasonable predictions about trends in the law."
Despite the court's innovative discussion of novel causa-
tion principles it would apply were the litigation to proceed to
trial, and its separate discussion elsewhere in the opinion of
the national consensus law it would apply regarding the gov-
ernment contractor defense,65 statute of limitations issue,66
61. Id. at 829-30.
62. Id. at 833.
63. Id. at 842.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 843-50.
66. Id. at 800-16.
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and punitive damage claims,67 Judge Weinstein concluded
that "lack of certainty because of scarcity of legal precedent
argues in favor of approving the settlement.""
In completing the Agent Orange Fairness Opinion the
court looked to the possibility that plaintiffs could pursue
compensation sources other than the chemical company de-
fendants for assistance.69 After reviewing a number of poten-
tially applicable federal programs that could help compensate
the veterans and their families for exposure to Agent Orange,
the court concluded that "[t]he government must be consid-
ered the source of ultimate protection whether or not there be
a satisfactory demonstration of causal relationship to Agent
Orange as a result of ongoing or future scientific studies. '70 In
closing, the court outlined a set of legal and equitable princi-
ples that "may serve to focus the parties' attention on some
available options" of distributing the $180 million settlement
fund.7 1
F. Judge Weinstein's 1985 Opinions: Summary Judgment
and Fund Distribution Orders
In a series of scholarly opinions issued from January
through June of 1985, Judge Weinstein decided to dispose of
numerous miscellaneous pending Agent Orange cases that
were not governed by the September 1984 settlement order. 2
During this same time frame, the court issued opinions deal-
ing with issues regarding distribution of the class action set-
tlement fund, including payment of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.
All of these opinions are important for the insights that they
provide in probing the nature and characteristics of toxic tort
law.
The court started its opinion granting summary judgment
for the seven chemical company defendants who opposed
67. Id. at 850-51.
68. Id. at 843.
69. Id. at 851.
70. Id. at 857.
71. Id. at 858.
72. Id. at 746.
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those Vietnam veterans and their family members that opted
out of the Rule 23(b)(3) class, by observing: "Plaintiff Viet-
nam veterans do suffer. Many deserve help from the govern-
ment. They cannot obtain aid through this suit against pri-
vate corporations."" s As the court went on to explain, "[t]he
most serious deficiency in plaintiffs' case is their failure to
present credible evidence of a causal link between exposure to
Agent Orange and the various diseases from which they are
allegedly suffering. 1 74 Specifically, the court was concerned
about the fact that all reliable studies of the effect of Agent
Orange provided no support for plaintiffs' causation claims.
Dividing the extant scientific data into epidemiological stud-
ies, on the one hand, and animal studies and industrial acci-
dent reports, on the other hand, Judge Weinstein flatly as-
serted that only the former were "useful studies having any
bearing on causation. ' 75 According to the court's reasoning,
while "epidemiological studies rely on 'statistical methods to
detect abnormally high incidences of disease in a study popu-
lation and to associate these incidences with unusual expo-
sures to suspect environmental factors',"7 6 toxicity studies of
animal and industrial accidents "rests on surmise and inappo-
site extrapolations .... ,"" Based on this restrictive view of
reliability, therefore, the court determined that plaintiffs' ex-
pert opinions - which made untenable inferences of causa-
tion - would be inadmissible under Rules 703 7 and 40379 of
73. A.O., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1229 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), afl'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 7234 (1988). The court separately certified a class on the
issue of punitive damages under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). "Potential class members
were allowed to opt out of the Rule 23(b)(3) class [regarding compensatory damages]
but not out of the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class." Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1231.
76. Id. (quoting Michael Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological
Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact, 7 HAuv. ENvTL. L. REv. 429, 431 (1983)).
77. 611 F. Supp. at 1231.
78. Id. at 1243. Rule 703 provides in pertinent part:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opin-
ion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the par-
ticular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence.
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the Federal Rules of Evidence.
In the course of his opinion granting summary judgment
to the chemical company defendants against the opt-out
plaintiffs, Judge Weinstein frequently referred to the special
nature of toxic tort litigation and the types of proof required
to establish causation. An important insight, in this regard,
was the court's view that "[iun a mass [toxic] tort case such as
Agent Orange, epidemiological studies on causation assume a
role of critical importance." 80 Drawing a parallel between the
instant litigation and the Swine Flu Immunization Products
Liability Litigation,81 the court noted a growing judicial ac-
ceptance of epidemiological evidence in factual contexts where
"the exact organic cause of a disease cannot be scientifically
isolated .... 8"a In a related way, however, the court indicated
that, in light of the liberalized approach of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 "towards the admissibility of relevant expert
testimony whenever it would be helpful to the trier" of fact,8
FED. R. EvID. 703.
79. 611 F. Supp. at 1243. Rule 403 provides in pertinent part: "Although rele-
vant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
80. 611 F. Supp. at 1239. Epidemiological evidence was referred to earlier in the
opinion in the following terms:
Epidemiological studies rely on "statistical methods to detect abnormally
high incidences of disease in a study population and to associate these inci-
dences with unusual exposures to suspect environmental factors." Michael
Dore, supra note 76, at 431. In their study of diseases in human populations,
epidemiologists use data from surveys, death certificates, and medical and
clinical observations.
Id. at 1231. Additionally, the court specifically noted: "A number of sound epidemio-
logical studies have been conducted on the health effects of exposure to Agent Or-
ange. These are the only useful studies having any bearing on causation." Id.
81. 508 F. Supp. 597 (D. Colo. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Lima v. United States, 708
F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1983).
82. 611 F. Supp. at 1240 (quoting In re Swine Flu Immunization Prod. Liab.
Litig., 508 F. Supp. at 907 (D. Colo. 1981)). Judge Weinstein pointed out that admis-
sion of epidemiological evidence could often take place through Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 803(8), the public records and report exception to the rule against hearsay. 611
F. Supp. at 1240.
83. 611 F. Supp. at 1242.
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compared to the more restrictive Frye rule,84 in those situa-
tions "[w]hen either the expert's qualifications or his testi-
mony lie at the periphery of what the scientific community
considers acceptable, special care should be exercised in eval-
uating the reliability and probative worth of the proffered tes-
timony under RULES 703 and 403." 85 According to Judge
Weinstein, "'[r]igorous examination' is especially important
in the mass toxic tort context where presentation to the trier
[of fact] of theories of causation depends almost entirely on
expert testimony."8 In pointing out the unacceptable vague-
ness and generality of plaintiffs' expert causation evidence,
the court excoriated the proof for a failure to provide specific
places, dates, and circumstances of exposure. Contrasting the
lack of exposure data to two other toxic tort cases decided by
federal courts8 7 where adequate exposure evidence existed,
Judge Weinstein noted that "[g]iven the difficulty of deter-
mining dose-response relationships in toxic tort situations," it
was necessary for plaintiffs to establish "the amount and exis-
tence of exposure to Agent Orange" 8 with detail. "Claims of
exposure without detail cannot suffice."8 9 In concluding the
summary judgment opinion, the court reasoned as follows:
After careful scrutiny of all available evidence in this
protracted litigation, there is no doubt that a directed
84. The Frye rule originated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923). This test required a showing of general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community. See generally Lucinda E. Minton, Note, Expert Testimony Based on
Novel Scientific Techniques: Admissibility Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 48
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 774 (1980) (modified Frye test better than balancing approach
under the Federal Rules of Evidence); Peter W. Huber, On Law and Sciosophy, 24
VAL. U. L. REV. 319 (1990) (argues that modern balancing approach leads to admission
of "junk science" in the courtroom); Cf. Robert F. Blomquist, Science, Toxic Tort
Law, and Expert Evidence: A Reaction to Peter Huber, 44 ARK. L. REV. 629 (1991)
(arguing that Huber's critique of Federal Rules of Evidence approach is
unpersuasive).
85. 611 F. Supp. at 1242.
86. Id. at 1244.
87. Id. at 1247 (cf. Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 545 (1984); Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah
1984)).
88. 611 F. Supp. at 1247.
89. Id.
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verdict at the close of each of plaintiffs' cases would be
required. Such careful scrutiny of proposed evidence is
especially appropriate in the toxic tort area. The uncer-
tainty of the evidence in such cases, dependent as it is
upon speculative scientific hypotheses and epidemiologi-
cal studies, creates a special need for robust screening of
experts and gatekeeping under Rules 403 and 703 by the
court."
A few months after the opt-out class summary judgment
in favor of defendants, Judge Weinstein decided a similar in-
dividual case involving a wrongful death action brought by the
surviving wife of John Lilley.91 While the particular diseases
and medical conditions focused on a form of lymph cancer
and coronary artery disease, the court found its earlier reason-
ing in dismissing the opt-out class 92 germane. At the outset,
the court assumed that the plaintiff would probably be able to
establish the chemical company's wrongful behavior in violat-
ing plaintiff's rights to bodily integrity. "In this respect the
case arguably resembles the asbestos litigation where substan-
tial contentions of cover-up and carelessness have been
made."'" Yet, plaintiff's evidence floundered for the same
overarching reason fatal to the opt-out class: failure to link
damages suffered to defendants' wrongful actions and inac-
tions. Thus, based on the available evidence, admissible at
trial, the court stated "[a]t this point any analogy to many of
90. Id. at 1260 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
In the Agent Orange litigation, it is remotely possible that a causal connec-
tion may at some time in the future be proved. As time goes on, proof of
connection to Agent Orange becomes less and less likely because the aging
Vietnam veterans are continuously exposed to confounding substances and
morbidity rises sharply with age from many natural causes. We can say that
proof has not been produced to this court sufficient to go to the jury.
Id. As a separate ground for the granting of the summary judgment in defendants'
favor, the court noted that the "plaintiffs are unable to overcome defendants' govern-
ment contract defense." Id. at 1263.
91. A.O. 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F. 2d 187 (2d Cir.) cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
92. A.O., 611 F. Supp. 1223.
93. 611 F. Supp. 1267, 1269 (citing Paul Brodeur, Annals of Law-Asbestos, THE
NEW YORKER, June 10, 17, 24, July 1, 1985. See also, PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS
MISCONDUCT (1985)).
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the asbestos or other similar toxic tort cases - where there is
a clear linkage between the product and a disease - ends."'
After ruling on the dispositive motions, Judge Weinstein
crafted opinions on the motions regarding attorneys' fees and
distribution of the settlement fund. In a typically meticulous
fashion, Judge Weinstein set the stage for defining an appro-
priate fee award from the settlement fund of $180 million that
had been in court for about a year. According to Judge Wein-
stein's opinion, "[a]n informed assessment of the fee petitions
requires consideration of the system of toxic tort litigation as
well as of the unique circumstances of this case.""5
From the court's perspective, "[p]rivate enforcement of
tort law is at best only a third line of defense against the
hazards of toxic substances." ' The paramount source of pro-
tection, according to the court, "is government and private
testing, control and regulation to prevent harm while afford-
ing society the benefits of modern chemical products. ' 97 The
second systemic safeguard is government-mandated or pri-
vately-arranged compensation and treatment programs. Judge
Weinstein articulated numerous inefficiencies in toxic tort liti-
gation. These include the following: "its high ratio of transac-
tion costs to recovery; its hit or miss characteristics, in that
some receive very high amounts and some nothing; and its
94. Id. at 1269. The court, however, denied defendants' motion for attorneys'
fees under FED. R. Civ. P. 11 since the plaintiffs' attorneys "have made a valuable
contribution by discovering and revealing evidence supporting the first leg of their
claims - defendants' and the government's knowledge of the dangers of using Agent
Orange and their failure to take reasonable precautions." Id. In dicta, the court also
observed that separate and independent grounds for granting summary judgment in
favor of the defendants were the statute of limitations, the problem of "the inability
to demonstrate which defendant caused harm" and the government contractor de-
fense. Id. at 1285. See also A.O., 611 F. Supp. 1290 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (granting sum-
mary judgment for failure of plaintiff to produce sufficient admissible evidence to
establish causation; in the alternative dismissal pursuant to FED. R. CIv. P. 37 for
repeated failure to cooperate in defendants' discovery requests).
95. A.O., 611 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
96. Id. (citing cf. INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES - ANALYSIS
AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES, A REPORT To CONGRESS IN COMPLIANCE wrrIH
SECTION 301(e) OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND
LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (PL-96-510) by the "Superfund Section 301(e) Study Group,"
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1982)).
97. 611 F. Supp. at 1303.
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questionable deterrent value in preventing the harm in the
first place."9 8 In spite of these problems, Judge Weinstein
concluded that private toxic tort suits had merit
as a backup compensation system with limited value as a
deterrent against human exposure to [harmful chemicals]
when (1) the [other] two defenses fail through govern-
ment and private neglect or (2) strict liability is the basis
of recovery and the failure occurs through ignorance of
the effects of actions taken by manufacturers and others
in reasonable reliance on then current knowledge. 9'
Based on the foregoing background analysis, the court pro-
ceeded to delineate in considerable detail the specific stan-
dards for attorneys' fees and expense claims by over one hun-
dred attorneys who had represented the veterans or their
families. 00 The court awarded $9.3 million for these purposes.
In late spring of 1985, the court ruled on distributing the
balance of the settlement fund - less attorneys' fees and ex-
penses. Judge Weinstein opined that "[t]here is no entirely
satisfactory answer to the distribution problem"' 01 because of
the indeterminate plaintiff and indeterminate defendant cau-
sation problems.'0 2 Thus, he decided to follow the proposal of-
fered by a Special Master. This distribution scheme involved
"a combination of insurance type compensation to give as
much help as possible to individuals who, in general, are most
in need of assistance, together with a foundation run by veter-
ans with the flexibility and discretion to take care of individu-
als and groups most in need of help."' 0 3 This opinion is fasci-
nating for its extensive discussion of the "Veterans' Dioxin
and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act,"
passed by Congress in 1984,104 and the proposed regulations to
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1303-95 (including Report and Recommendation of United States
Magistrate regarding reconsideration and supplementation of fee application).
101. A.O., 611 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
102. Id. See supra notes 58 to 68 and accompanying text.
103. 611 F. Supp. at 1400.
104. Id. at 1404 (citing Pub. L. 98-542, 98 Stat. 2725 (1984)).
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implement the federal statutory scheme."°5 While hopeful that
the federal government would begin to provide a substantial
source of compensation for class members, Judge Weinstein
expressed a pragmatic need for judicial action:
So far as a distribution plan is concerned, it clearly is
not possible to wait for the government and others to
make further funds and resources available. We are deal-
ing with a scarce resource. Many class members have im-
mediate needs, and much of the value of a settlement lies
in the ability to make funds available promptly. The hard
choices that must be made in distribution must be made
by the court now.'"
The exhaustive analysis of the proposed distributional
options and priorities1 07 is analogous to a bankruptcy court's
review of a reorganization plan under the Bankruptcy Code.10 8
After deciding upon the general structure and purpose of the
distribution scheme,109 the court spelled out in considerable
detail the specific elements of its order: (1) awards based on
compensable death or disability, (2) determining total disabil-
ity, (3) proof of death and eligible survivorship, (4) demon-
stration of exposure to Agent Orange during military service
in Vietnam, (5) payment program time limits, (6) structure
and amount of disability and death benefits, (7) means test
and impact of payment on public and private assistance, (8)
implementation and operation of the payment program, (9)
private attorney fee arrangements, (10) establishment of a
class assistance foundation, and (11) guidelines for Australian
and New Zealand claimants.1 0
In June of 1985, Judge Weinstein issued another signifi-
cant opinion in the Agent Orange litigation, in response to a
motion to set aside the plaintiff's management committee's
105. Id. (citing 50 Fed. Reg. 15, 848-55 (1985) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. §§
1.17, 3.102, 3.11a-3.11b, 3.813)).
106. Id. at 1405-06 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 1403-10.
108. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1988) (detailing standards for confirmation of a plan).
109. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
110. 611 F. Supp. at 1410-51.
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agreement to pay certain attorney members a 300% return on
funds advanced during the litigation.11' The court noted that
the issues presented by the motions "present new and difficult
questions in the financing of major toxic tort litigations.""' 2 In
Judge Weinstein's view, "[i]mplicated are the boundaries of
legal ethics and the legality of fee arrangements among attor-
neys in class actions." Concluding on equitable grounds not to
set aside the plaintiffs' attorneys' agreement for fee arrange-
ments, the court indicated that "[i]n any future case in this
district such an agreement must be revealed to the court and
members of the class as soon as possible" because "[a] 'sun-
shine' rule is essential to protect the interests of the public,
the class and the honor of the legal profession."' 3
G. The Second Circuit Opinions: April 1987
In the first of nine consecutive opinions issued in the
spring of 1987, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit opened its multifaceted review with a trench-
ant observation about the Agent Orange litigation: "[bly any
measure, this is an extraordinary piece of litigation.""" The
court specifically labeled several aspects of the case as "ex-
traordinary" including its "procedural aspects,"'' 5 "size of the
settlement,"1 6 and the scheme "to distribute the class settle-
ment award.""17 The key issue in this particular case was the
reasonableness of the settlement. In reaching its conclusion
that the $180 million class action settlement was, indeed,
fair," 8 the court of appeals rejected arguments that the dis-
trict court lacked diversity jurisdiction, that the class action
was not properly certified, that notice to the class was inade-
quate, and that the court was required to hold a fairness hear-
ing before giving notice of the settlement to the class
111. A.O., 611 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
112. Id. at 1453.
113. Id. at 1453-54.
114. A.O., 818 F.2d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
115. Id. at 150.
116. Id. at 151.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 170-74.
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members.
Despite its affirmance of the district court's jurisdiction,
procedure, and settlement approval, the Second Circuit ex-
pressed "skepticism over the usefulness of class actions in so-
called mass tort cases and, in particular, claims for injuries
resulting from toxic exposure." 1 9 In this regard, the appellate
court discounted the utility of dividing the causation issue be-
tween "generic causation - whether Agent Orange is harmful
at all, regardless of the degree or nature of exposure, and what
ailments it may cause - and individual causation - whether
a particular veteran suffers from a particular ailment as a re-
sult of exposure to Agent Orange, ' 120 with the former issue
being tried by the class action. According to the Second Cir-
cuit, the questions of general causation in this toxic tort case
were irrelevant. Rather,
[t]he relevant question ... is not whether Agent Or-
ange has the capacity to cause harm, the generic causa-
tion issue, but whether it did cause harm and to whom.
That determination is highly individualistic, and depends
upon the characteristics of individual plaintiffs (e.g. state
of health, lifestyle) and the nature of their exposure to
Agent Orange. Although genetic causation and individual
circumstances concerning each plaintiff and his or her ex-
posure to Agent Orange thus appear to be inextricably in-
tertwined, the class action would have allowed generic
causation to be determined without regard to those char-
acteristics and the individual's exposure. 21
Moreover, the court of appeals was skeptical of the exis-
tence of any common questions of law in the case, with the
possible "exception of the military contractor defense.M 22
Similarly, in its comments on the different interests of poten-
tial plaintiffs in toxic tort cases stemming from variations in
the strength of their claims, the court noted that "the dynam-
119. Id. at 164.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 165.
122. Id.
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ics of a class action in a [similar toxic tort] case... may either
impair the ability of representative parties to protect the in-
terests of the class or cause the inefficient use of judicial
resources."'
123
In the second appellate opinion following the Agent Or-
ange settlement, the court generally upheld the main features
of Judge Weinstein's distribution plan.124 Noting that "the
distribution plan adopted by the district court does not en-
tirely disregard traditional tort principles of causation, ' 1 2
that the plan was "governed by criteria that are relatively
easy and inexpensive to apply, 12' 6 and that the plan dealt
with the dilemma of allocating an inadequate fund among
competing claimants, the Second Circuit approved - with
one exception - the district court's exercise of its discretion.
The aspect of the district court's distribution scheme, which
the appellate court found objectionable, was the proposed
manner of establishing "a class assistance foundation . . . to
fund projects and services that will benefit the entire class.' 2 7
While the court of appeals found it appropriate for a district
court to set aside designated funds for specific purposes, the
reviewing court found it wrong to delegate judicial supervision
of this purpose to a foundation's board of directors.12 8
The third opinion by the Second Circuit following the
Agent Orange settlement addressed the opt-out plaintiffs' ap-
peal of the district court's summary judgment in favor of the
chemical company defendants.129 Choosing to affirm based on
the existence of the military contractor defense, the court of
appeals did not address the alternative causation grounds that
the district court had postulated for granting the summary
123. Id.
124. A.O., 818 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
125. Id. at 184.
126. Id. at 183. The district court adopted the Social Security Act's definition of
"disability" and used this as the basis for distributing individual claims "unless the
disability was predominantly caused by a traumatic, accidental or self-inflicted in-
jury." 611 F. Supp. at 1413.
127. 818 F.2d at 184 (quoting 611 F. Supp. at 1432).
128. Id. at 185.
129. A.O., 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
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judgment.180 Stating that "the information possessed by the
government at pertinent times was as great as, or greater
than, that possessed by the chemical companies,"'' the court
went on to add a further ground for affirmance: that the
chemical companies could not have breached a duty to inform
the government because "[e]ven today, the weight of present
scientific evidence does not establish that Agent Orange in-
jured personnel in Vietnam . . ... 1" At its foundation, the
court of appeals' opinion was concerned about the military
procurement process and the disincentives for private enter-
prise to provide war material if the prospect for liability was
substantial.
The fourth 1987 Agent Orange court of appeals decision
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the opt-out plaintiffs'
claims against the United States government based on the
Feres doctrine and the discretionary function exemption to
the Federal Tort Claims Act.1" According to the Second Cir-
cuit, "[b]oth [doctrines] preclude judicial 'second-guessing'..
. of discretionary legislative and executive decisions such as
those that were made concerning Agent Orange"'"4 where the
decision to use the jungle defoliant was made by high level
military and political officials and "designed to help the veter-
ans in fighting the armed conflict in which they were
engaged."'3 5
The Second Circuit's fifth opinion in this line affirmed in
part the district court's dismissal of the direct claims by
spouses and children of Vietnam veterans against the United
States government arising out of spraying of Agent Orange. " 6
While the district court had dismissed these claims by way of
summary judgment for lack of proof of medical causation, the
Second Circuit concluded that the claims had to be dismissed
130. Id.
131. Id. at 190.
132. Id.
133. A.O., 818 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1987).
134. Id. at 199 (citation omitted).
135. Id. at 200.
136. A.O., 818 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1987).
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for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 187 This determination
was based on the court's expansive reading of the Feres doc-
trine and the policy implications of the judiciary's second-
guessing of the military and executive branch." 8
In the sixth opinion, the Second Circuit upheld Judge
Weinstein's dismissal of the third party indemnity claims by
the chemical companies against the United States govern-
ment.13 9 In large measure, the court's opinion was motivated
by its assessment that the Feres doctrine is particularly com-
pelling in "massive tort claims" against the government. 4" In
the court's view, "[t]he greater the scope of a military decision
and the more far-reaching its effect, the more it assumes the
aspects of a political determination, which, in and of itself, is
not subject to judicial second-guessing. 1 4 1 .
In the seventh 1987 Agent Orange court of appeals opin-
ion, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of various
individual claims based on a variety of different theories in-
cluding failure to comply with a discovery order, exceedance
of the appropriate statute of limitations, the discretionary
function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, and the
military contractor defense.142
The eighth Second Circuit opinion reversed Judge Wein-
stein's order upholding the fee sharing agreement between the
lead counsel in the Agent Orange case. 43 The court of appeals
held that this agreement was invalid and would not be en-
forced in view of its potential for creating conflict between
counsel and the class.14' Finally, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals completed its set of opinions in the Agent Orange
case by substantially upholding the district court's multi-mil-
lion dollar attorneys' fee award.1' 5 In a revealing analysis of
137. Id. at 204.
138. Id.
139. A.O., 818 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1987).
140. Id. at 206 (quoting Feres, 340 U.S. at 135).
141. Id. (citation omitted).
142. A.0., 818 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1987).
143. A.O., 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1987).
144. Id. at 225.
145. A.O., 818 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1987).
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one aspect of the lower court decision - the denial of a risk
multiplier for counsel - the court of appeals wrote:
A court .. in adjudging whether to award a risk multi-
plier, should examine closely the nature of the action in
order to determine whether, as a matter of public policy,
it is the type of case worthy of judicial encouragement. In
our view, the case here clearly is not ....
From the outset, the factual and legal difficulties hinder-
ing the successful prosecution of plaintiffs' case have been
staggering. Factual evidence of causation has been at best
tenuous and, if not for the last-minute settlement, the
military contractor defense would have prevented class
members from realizing any recovery at all. When these
significant weaknesses in plaintiffs' case are viewed in
light of the sheer magnitude of the action and the
thousands of hours of court time that this type of action
requires, it becomes clear that the federal courts should
not actively encourage the bar to file such dubious actions
in the future. 14 6
During the first part of the 1980s, following and in some
cases contemporaneously with the Agent Orange Litigation,
other courts grappled with a variety of issues in the bur-
geoning area of toxic tort litigation. One of the most poignant
cases involved human exposure to "downwind" radiation from
atomic bomb tests.
II. Radiation Exposure "Downwind": Allen v. United
States
In a dramatic toxic tort case brought in federal district
court in Utah, twenty-four "bellwether cases" out of a total of
1,192 consolidated individual claims were tried in Allen v.
United States.147 The theory of the case was that the United
States had negligently caused death and injuries stemming
from radioactive fallout released during atomic weapons test-
146. Id. at 236.
147. 588 F. Supp. 247, 258 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
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ing in the American desert during the 1950s. From the outset
of the litigation, 14 8 the government took the position that the
United States was not liable for three reasons: (1) because of
the "discretionary function" exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act, which made the government immune; 149 (2) be-
cause the applicable federal statute of limitation barred the
bringing of claims such as were involved in the case, since the
claims accrued more than two years before the filing of an ap-
propriate claim notice;150 and (3) because the claims against
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) were in the nature of
claims "for giving false assurances as to the safety of exposure
to radioactive fallout"151 and were barred by the "misrepre-
sentation" exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act.152 In re-
jecting these challenges at the threshold, U.S. District Court
Judge Bruce S. Jenkins characterized the "proceeding [as be-
ing] far from the ordinary case. 1 53 Distinguishing between
policy formulation "at a presidential level" or at the level of a
head of an agency, on the one hand, and "the exercise of judg-
ment at a regional level, or at a site level, by a [government]
manager, a scientist, an engineer, a public affairs or informa-
tion officer, and auxiliary personnel, 15 4 on the other hand, the
court provided an apt overview of the entire case:
Proceeding down the descending ladder of abstraction,
from the general policy formulated on the highest level to
the concrete implementation of that policy, one must un-
derstand that the case here is not footed on the fact that
high level policy decisions were made - but is footed on
the alleged, inappropriate manner in which such policy
decisions were carried out. The distinction cries out.155
148. Allen v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 476, 492 (D. Utah 1981) (denying de-
fendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
149. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1990). See generally HOWARD BALL, JUSTICE DOWNWIND:
AMERICA'S ATOMIC TESTING PROGRAM IN THE 1950s (1986).
150. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1988).
151. 527 F. Supp. at 492.
152. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1992)).
153. Id. at 486.
154. Id. at 485.
155. Id.
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Eschewing a formalistic approach, the district court also took
a functional approach to interpreting the government's stat-
ute of limitations and misrepresentation exception
arguments.15 "6
Nearly three years later, after holding a thirteen-week
bench trial and deliberating for seventeen months on the case,
Judge Jenkins issued a 225-page printed opinion which pro-
vided substantial relief for many of the bellwether plain-
tiffs. 157 From the standpoint of toxic tort jurisprudence, the
district court opinion is notable for several reasons. First, like
Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange Litigation,'58 Judge
Jenkins used a touch of the dramatic in seeking to describe
the emotional and human dimensions in the case. At the be-
ginning of the decision on the merits, in a passage worthy of
full quotation, the district court observed:
In a sense this case began in the mind of a thoughtful
resident of Greece named Democritus some twenty-five
hundred years ago. In response to a question put two cen-
turies earlier by a compatriot, Thales, concerning the fun-
damental nature of matter, Democritus suggested the
idea of atoms. This case is concerned with atoms, with
government, with people, with legal relationships, and
with social values.
This case is concerned with what reasonable men in
positions of decision-making in the United States govern-
ment between 1951 and 1963 knew or should have known
about the fundamental nature of matter.
It is concerned with the duty, if any, that the United
States government had to tell its people, particularly
those in proximity to the experiment site, what it knew or
156. Id. at 489-92.
157. Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247. According to the trial court:
The trial transcript ... extends to more than 7,000 pages. The exhibits now
in evidence ... amount to over 54,000 pages of written material contained in
19 cardboard boxes. Depositions filed with the court in this action fill an ad-
ditional 5 boxes. In addition, the court has deemed additional material sub-
mitted by the parties to have been offered and received • • • [pursuant to the
judicial notice provisions of Rule 201(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence].
Id. at 258-59, n.3.
158. See supra notes 52 - 114 and accompanying text.
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should have known about the dangers to them from the
government's experiments with nuclear fission conducted
aboveground in the brushlands of Nevada during those
critical years.
This case is concerned with the perception and the
apprehension of its political leaders of international dan-
gers threatening the United States from 1951 to 1963. It
is concerned with high level determinations as to what to
do about them and whether such determinations legally
excuse the United States from being answerable to a com-
paratively few members of its population for injuries al-
legedly resulting from open air nuclear experiments con-
ducted in response to such perceived dangers.
It is concerned with method and quantum of proof of
the cause in fact of claimed biological injuries. It is con-
cerned with the passage of time, the attendant diminish-
ment of memory, the availability of contemporary infor-
mation about open air atomic testing and the application
of a statute of repose.
It is concerned with what plaintiffs - laymen, not
experts - knew or should have known about the biologi-
cal consequences that could result from open air nuclear
tests and when each plaintiff knew or should have known
of such consequences.
It is ultimately concerned with who in fairness should
bear the cost in dollars of injury to those persons whose
injury is demonstrated to have been caused more likely
than not by nation-state conducted open air nuclear
events.1 59
Second, the district court entered the technical thicket by
assembling mini-primers on basic principles of radiation and
nuclear physics, 60 nuclear fallout,"' and health physics. 62
Candidly observing that "[e]valuation of the risks and conse-
quences of exposure to atomic radiation" demands some fa-
miliarity with basic scientific concepts, Judge Jenkins con-
159. 588 F. Supp. at 257.
160. Id. at 260-87.
161. Id. at 287-311.
162. Id. at 311-29.
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tended that "[sluch familiarity is a prelude to the
knowledgeable application of rules of law."" 3 Almost philo-
sophical on this point, the court noted that "[i]t does not
come easily. It did not come easily for the court. '1 64
Third, the district court reasserted its earlier decision in
rejecting the government's discretionary function exception
argument concerning the Federal Tort Claims Act. Resorting
to another classical description, the court reasoned as follows:
The United States misperceives the intent of the act.
For example, we choose the objective: Rome. We choose
the road: the Appian Way. Discretionary choices both.
We make such choices as a matter of power and as a mat-
ter of right.
The manner in which we drive from our location to
Rome, carelessly or carefully, is also a matter of choice.
But, it is not a matter of discretion as used in the Tort
Claims Act. It is not a matter of discretion because such a
choice is subject to a standard, a limitation. It is subject
to a limitation imposed by a civilized society as to appro-
priate conduct.26 5
Thus, according to the court, "such operational conduct" of
performing open air atomic bomb tests "was not a matter of
discretion because such operational conduct was subject to a.
* * standard of conduct," a duty called "due care, reasonable
care under the circumstances . ..."166
Fourth, Judge Jenkins rejected the government's alterna-
tive argument that the statute of limitations should bar the
plaintiffs from bringing their tort suit. Reiterating the unique
aspects of the litigation, the court opined:
The considerable time spent reviewing the record and ex-
hibits relating to the causal relationship between cancer
and ionizing radiation has awakened this court's concern
as to whether any layman could reasonably be said to
163. Id. at 260.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 336.
166. Id.
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have the requisite knowledge of the causal relationships
- particularly during the years prior to the commence-
ment of this action. The cause-in-fact issues in this law-
suit are extraordinary and complex.... Cancer induction
by ionizing radiation is a far more technical problem than
the simple A-collides-with-B chain of causation found in
most tort actions. 1 7
Accordingly, the court concluded that "[alt best some of these
plaintiffs could be said to have information of a very general
nature, essentially a suspicion, that there may be some con-
nection between radiation and cancer"; 68 therefore, plaintiffs
were held to have filed their actions in a timely fashion.
Fifth, the district court resolved the duty and breach of
duty questions in plaintiffs' favor by discerning a protective
legislative scheme promulgated by Congress, the superior
knowledge of the federal government regarding risks from ra-
diation exposure, and the standards of care followed by. the
government at other nuclear laboratories apart from the Ne-
vada test site.169
Sixth, Judge Jenkins wrestled with the causation issue by
analyzing the unique problems facing toxic tort plaintiffs.
These problems, according to the court, included a long la-
tency period between exposure to a toxic substance and ob-
servable injury;17 the "non-specific nature of the alleged in-
jury" which cannot be readily traced back to specific causes1 71
and, therefore, creates the "indeterminate plaintiff" prob-
lem;172 and a failure of Congress to enact statutory procedures
to ameliorate these proof problems.' s
In resolving the merits of the dispute, the district court
entered final judgment in favor of the government on fourteen
167. Id. at 341. See also id. at 343 (discussing knowledge requirements).
168. Id. at 346.
169. Id. at 347-404.
170. Id. at 405.
171. Id. at 406.
172. Id. at 413 (citing Palma J. Strand, Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional
Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Vic-
tim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REV. 575, 582 (1983)).
173. Id. at 414.
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claims, and against the government on nine claims, while leav-
ing one claim outstanding.1"' It then granted a Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(b) motion allowing the government to immediately appeal
those claims resolved against it.
- On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit reversed, basing its decision solely on the legal
point "that the discretionary function exception precludes
government liability.1' 75 The court of appeals noted that after
the district court judgment, the Supreme Court had decided
United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense (Varig Airlines)1 76 - a case involving a suit
against the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") for neg-
ligence in implementing airplane inspection and design certifi-
cation programs, "allowing improper flammable materials and
a defective heater system 1 77 to be used on certain aircraft.
The Varig Airlines Court held that the United States was im-
mune from suit because the FAA's actions constituted the
performance of a "discretionary function," which was exempt
from potential Federal Tort Claims Act liability.1 78 Comparing
the atomic testing program to the FAA program found to be a
discretionary function in Varig Airlines, the Tenth Circuit
undertook the following analysis:
In the case before us, as in Varig, the government ac-
tors had a general statutory duty to promote safety; this
duty was broad and discretionary. In the case before us, it
was left to the AEC, as in Varig it was left to the Secre-
tary of Transportation and the FAA to decide exactly
how to protect public safety. 17 9
174. Id. at 429-47.
175. 816 F.2d 1417, 1419 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
176. 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 819-21.
179. 816 F.2d at 1421.
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III. The Asbestos Industry on Trial
A. Seminal Fifth Circuit Decisions
It is accurate to observe that serious asbestos litigation in
the United States began during the 1970s in the deep south
states comprising the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
with the decision in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products
Corp.180 Yet, it was not until the remarkable series of Fifth
Circuit opinions in Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,181
during the early to mid-1980s, that the court probed deeply
and started to grapple with a variety of serious issues in toxic
torts jurisprudence.
It is important to seek context. As stated by the Fifth
Circuit, in a broad and comparative historical sketch of Amer-
ican asbestos litigation during the time period of the 1970s to
the early 1980s:
No other category of tort litigation has ever ap-
proached, either qualitatively or quantitatively, the mag-
nitude of claims premised on asbestos exposure. By 1981,
only eight years after the decision in Borel ... it had be-
come the largest area of product liability litigation, far
surpassing the number of cases generated by the contro-
versies over Agent Orange, the drug DES, the Dalkon
Shield, intrauterine device, or even automobile defects.
Between the early 1970s and 1982 the asbestos . . . com-
panies and their insurers expended over $1 billion in liti-
gation expenses, damage awards and settlements. This
figure does not include the costs incurred by state or fed-
eral governments, expenses and compensation and work-
ers' compensation claims, or the costs resulting from the
Chapter 11 proceedings initiated by Johns-Manville,
180. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) (applying Texas law), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
869 (1974).
181. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984),
vacated and question certified, 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. de-
clined, 469 So. 2d 99 (Miss. 1985), decision after cert., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986)
(en banc) (upholding admission of cancer evidence in an asbestosis case and ruling
that punitive damages are available in a mass tort case), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1002
(1988).
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Unarco, and Amatex.18s
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit's Borel opinion - written by
Judge John Wisdom and discussing Texas tort law in a diver-
sity action - had extended the theory of strict liability to oc-
cupational diseases, while reviewing the disease mechanisms
caused by human inhalation of asbestos dust. Moreover, the
Borel court also analyzed a number of significant legal issues
that, at the time, presented novel questions of tort law includ-
ing the following: a manufacturer's duty to warn in a product
liability context, the applicability of joint and several liability
for numerous exposures to toxic substances, and whether a
worker's knowledge of exposure hazards should limit their
right to obtain damages. 183
Over a decade later, in the summer of 1984, the Fifth Cir-
cuit wrote its initial opinion in Jackson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp.18 4 Jackson, a former shipyard worker, brought a
strict liability action against manufacturers and sellers of as-
bestos products used at his workplace. Jackson was able to
settle with some of the defendants before trial. At trial, he
obtained a jury verdict against two of the three remaining de-
fendants. The trial court entered a judgment based on the
jury's assessment of actual damages of $391,500 and punitive
damages of $500,000 against Manville, and $125,000 against
Raybestos-Manhattan. 185 Affirming in part, and reversing in
part, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit up-
held, among other rulings, the validity of the strict liability
cause of action, found punitive damages inappropriate, and
held that it was improper for the trial court to allow the plain-
tiff to introduce evidence of his probability of contracting can-
cer following the onset of asbestosis.186 The court's treatment
of the last issue was particularly important for several rea-
sons. First, the panel was forced to rethink the traditional "all
182. Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1335-36 (5th Cir.
1985) (en banc) (citations omitted).
183. 493 F.2d at 1087-1104.
184. 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984).
185. Id. at 511.
186. Id. at 532.
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or nothing" rule of tort law, albeit under Mississippi law,
"whereby the plaintiff becomes entitled to full compensation
for those prospective damages that are proved to be 'probable'
... but is not entitled to any compensation if the proof does
not establish a greater than 50 percent chance. 1 8 7 Second, in
resolving the applicability of the "all or nothing" approach to
tort damages, the Fifth Circuit focused on what it considered
"[tihe real question": "whether, when Jackson's cause of ac-
tion accrued for asbestosis injuries, a cause of action accrued
simultaneously for cancer injuries, even though Jackson had
not developed cancer at the time of trial."188 Third, in answer-
ing the question of the accrual date of Jackson's cause of ac-
tion, the court of appeals waxed philosophical:
Causality as an operation of physical events which
may culminate in future harm must be distinguished from
causality as an operation of law which may culminate in a
claim for future harm. In the context of a latent disease
case, causality poses a novel question whether the accrual
of a claim based on the manifestation of one disease re-
sults in the simultaneous accrual of claims based on
"probable" future manifestations of physically separate
diseases. The ultimate question is how abstractly to char-
acterize the wrong that underlies the cause of action.""9
Holding that accrual of a strict liability cause of action
for causing cancer would not occur from the time an offending
substance merely invaded the body, the court interpreted past
Mississippi judicial decisions to conclude that accrual would
not occur until the disease became physically manifest. 190 Fi-
nally, the panel bolstered its decision that a cause of action
did not accrue until actual physical manifestation of the dis-
ease by reasoning that otherwise "massive dislocations in the
rights of parties" would occur. 9" Thus, "[a] doctrinaire appli-
187. Id. at 516 (footnote omitted).
188. Id. at 517.
189. Id. at 517-18.
190. Id. at 518-19.
191. Id. at 520.
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cation of the reasonable certainty rule would result in a mis-
matching of entitlement, liability, and compensation. 'Persons
who contract the first, but not the second, disease will receive
a windfall and, in the aggregate, the defendant will overcom-
pensate the injured class.' "192 Indeed, distributional equity
considerations were also germane to the court's interpretation
of Mississippi law as disallowing punitive damages in the con-
text of a mass tort case of unprecedented scope. As stated by
the court, "[iln the mass catastrophe ... [arising] from perva-
sive asbestos exposure, the allowance of punitive damages
could destroy the marginally viable system of loss distribution
in strict liability"1 93 because of the "portent of overkill as [a
threat to] future claimants. '"1 9
The entire Fifth Circuit in Jackson II, however, decided
to review the panel decision en banc. On rehearing, the court
of appeals en banc upheld the panel decision on the viability
of the strict liability claim but superseded the remainder of
the opinion. Although conceding that, due to the great num-
ber of cases and the perplexing issues at stake, asbestos litiga-
tion had assumed a "unique nature," the court rejected the
explicit or implicit fashioning of federal common law in asbes-
tos cases.1 95 Drawing an analogy, among others, to one of the
Second Circuit's opinions in In re Agent Orange Product Lia-
bility Litigation,9 the court concluded that "ensuring the
availability of compensation for injured [asbestos] plaintiffs is
predominantly a matter of state concern and, in the absence
of congressional enactments, state law, both as to the extent
192. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 120 n.45
(D.C. Cir. 1982)).
193. Id. at 526.
194. Id.
195. 750 F.2d 1314, 1323-24 (5th Cir. 1985). See also 781 F.2d. 394, 397 (5th Cir.
1986) (the court of appeals' later interpretation of the meaning of Jackson I and
Jackson II in its later en banc ruling, following the Mississippi Supreme Court's de-
clining certification of state law issues). As noted by the court in Jackson III: "In
Jackson II we expressly held that state tort law must govern the outcome of this case,
yet the basis of Jackson I ... was, in retrospect, less Mississippi tort law than it was
federal common law." Id. at 397 n.3.
196. 750 F.2d at 1325 (citing In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig. 635 F.2d 987,
993 (2d Cir. 1980)).
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of compensation available and punitive damages, must ap-
ply. ' ' 19 7 Moreover, the court detected a broader policy reason
to reject a federal common law of asbestos approach:
The simple fact is that, once the need to limit plaintiffs'
recoveries is used to justify the creation of federal sub-
stantive rules precluding the recovery of punitive dam-
ages and narrowing the scope of the actionable injury,
there would be no principled means of restricting the ap-
plication of federal common law to other matters, either
in the context of asbestos litigation or in relation to simi-
lar legal problems. As a consequence, federal courts would
become increasingly responsible for establishing a general
federal tort law in a manner we think is inconsistent with
the teachings of Erie and the logic behind our federal
system.198
Yet, the en banc court declined to follow the route of its
panel, which had attempted to predict how the Mississippi
Supreme Court would resolve the issues of state tort law. In-
stead, the court decided to certify two key questions to the
Mississippi Supreme Court pursuant to Mississippi procedure:
(1) whether Mississippi regarded as an actionable injury the
risk of incurring future cancer from past exposure to a sub-
stance, and (2) whether Mississippi would allow recovery of
punitive damages in asbestos litigation. 99
Five judges on the court of appeals dissented from the
Jackson en banc decision. The dissenters viewed the problems
of mass toxic tort suits for asbestos injuries as a threat to the
continued purpose of the court system. They observed: "[W]e
confront a sequence of massive tort claims that has unparal-
leled geographic and financial dimensions. We confront cases
where the application of divergent governing principles can
destroy the rights of similarly situated claimants. We confront
no less than a challenge to our purpose as courts." 00
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1326-27 (citation omitted).
199. Id. at 1327-29.
200. Id. at 1330 (dissent).
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Accordingly, the dissent urged the need for a uniform
common law approach crafted by the Supreme Court of the
United States instead of an "inferior appellate court. '20 1
While agreeing with the majority that "legislation [by Con-
gress] would be the preferred solution to the dilemma of pro-
viding an adequate scheme for the proper distribution of com-
pensation" in asbestos suits, 20 2 practical reality required the
intervention of the Supreme Court. In the dissent's view, the
Supreme Court was "the only institution other than Congress
capable of imposing the uniformity necessary to resolve this
problem in a just manner" since that "Court has the power to
formulate federal common law which will ensure equitable
compensation for all claimants. 20 3 The dissent, therefore,
urged certification to the Supreme Court of federal common
law questions on punitive damages and accrual of latent
causes of action in asbestos litigation.204
Less than two months later, the Mississippi Supreme
Court declined certification of the questions posed by the
Fifth Circuit. 0 5 Thereafter, in Jackson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., ("Jackson III")206 - another en banc opinion is-
sued in 1986 - the Fifth Circuit decided to resolve the under-
lying issues of state tort law in the case. In large measure,
these rulings reversed the panel decision which had predicted
more circumscribed tort principles. The court of appeals held
that: (1) Mississippi law would permit punitive damages in
product liability actions, including mass tort cases where the
evidence indicated a gross disregard for workers' rights, (2) re-
covery could occur for the reasonable medical probability of
contracting cancer in the future, and (3) damages could be ob-
tained for mental distress resulting from the plaintiff's knowl-
edge of an increased risk of contracting cancer. 01
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1332.
203. Id. at 1333.
204. Id. at 1335 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3)).
205. Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 469 So. 2d 99 (Miss. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1988).
206. 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
207. Id. at 415.
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In a spirited and comprehensive dissenting opinion, five
circuit judges articulated their profound concern with the wis-
dom of the majority's disposition in Jackson III. The dissent-
ers began their critique by asserting that "[Ihe learned,
lengthy opinion of the majority is the wrong response by the
wrong court."20 8 The dissident judges viewed the majority's
opinion as the wrong response for a variety of reasons. "First,"
they contended, "looking backward to the signposts of stare
decisis has turned the court away from the road to justice be-
cause this case exceeds the limits of ordinary case and contro-
versy litigation in our complex, interrelated society. ' 20 9 A sec-
ond criticism in the dissenting opinion was that "the court
[inappropriately] respond[ed] to innovative lawyers pressing
for immediate financial recovery" in the course of "case-by-
case adjudication." 10 The minority considered this case to en-
compass problems outside their jurisdiction, and refrained
from faulting the attorney's case-by-case approach in order to
require them "to anticipate the impact of [the] judgment on
the host of [future] claimants ... who deserve to share in the
finite proceeds which a limited group of defendants can pro-
vide to compensate mass tort victims."2" ' Third, the dissent-
ers in Jackson III partially attributed the sweep of the major-
ity's rulings to the court's "frustra[tion] by lack of
congressional action.121 2 As a fourth reason for their disagree-
ment with the majority, the dissenting judges opined that the
majority did not properly perceive the true question
presented in the case. As more fully stated in the dissenting
opinion:
This seminal case concerns much more than James Leroy
Jackson's individual claim against some companies that
may have furnished an unsafe product to a shipyard in
which he worked. We know better.
Our dockets tell us so - dockets in the Southern
208. Id. (dissent).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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District of Mississippi, dockets in the Eastern District of
Texas, dockets in the Eastern District of Louisiana, dock-
ets in the Southern District of Texas, dockets throughout
the state and federal courts across this nation. Tens of
thousands of similarly situated claimants are already
seeking relief against the same defendants, and a legion of
other potential plaintiffs stand in the wings, awaiting the
predictable manifestation of their identical exposure.
Other public and private plaintiffs seek recovery from the
same defendants for costs incurred in removing asbestos
materials from structures in every area of the country. " "
Indeed, in an expansive textual footnote, the dissent re-
ferred to the "[n]umerous [recent] texts and articles [which]
define the dimensions of asbestos litigation, litigation costs,
and the resulting fiscal problems created for plaintiffs and de-
fendants' 414 in these toxic tort cases. To the dissenting judges,
the Jackson litigation seemed to be an archetype of emerging
toxic tort cases in asbestos disputes and other types of mass
torts. The closing portions of the dissenting opinion support
this conclusion and indicate that the dissenters thought the
better approach to a difficult judicial problem was to ask the
Supreme Court of the United States to craft uniform federal
common law on key questions that were likely to reappear in
future toxic tort cases. As argued in the dissenting opinion:
[T]he court fails to take into account that what we
say here creates new precedent. We are not passing a
milepost along a known path leading to a chosen goal. In-
stead, the court, without a goal, chooses a new path which
will compel the way of all litigants who come later. Given
this situation, the proper judicial response should be one
based on a broad view of the whole question.
The wrong court gives this wrong response. We do
not say this because the majority opinion is structured as
a prediction of what the Mississippi Supreme Court
213. Id. at 416.
214. Id. n.2. The literature referenced by the dissenters was extensive. Footnote
2 of the dissenting opinion is a veritable annotated bibliography on the subject of
asbestos litigation up to the date of the decision.
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would decide about the novel issues fixed in our jurispru-
dence by today's decision. We say so because a national
problem has been adjudicated as though it were a state
problem after the concerned state court wisely refused to
accept our certification of the issues to it.
Sadly the majority chose to certify these issues to
that court rather than to the Supreme Court of the
United States. The United States Supreme Court could
have given us proper responses ....
The problems we face in this litigation are ones of
national public policy. To respond to such policy is be-
yond the ability of this diversity-based court. Such policy
cannot be subject to the whims of individual states be-
cause matters of national public policy have nationwide
application. Since Congress has not provided a solution,
the Supreme Court of the United States should have been
asked to provide one.215
Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc. 16 was another bed-
rock Fifth Circuit decision addressing questions arising from
asbestos litigation. In affirming a decision by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas to cer-
tify a class of plaintiffs in personal injury cases arising from
exposure to asbestos insulation products under FED. R. Civ. P.
23(a), 217 a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
rebuffed the interlocutory appeal and affirmed the lower court
on utilitarian grounds. The Court of Appeals reasoned as
follows:
Courts have usually avoided class actions in the mass
accident or tort setting. Because of differences between
individual plaintiffs on issues of liability . . . as well as
damages, it has been feared that separate trials would
overshadow the common disposition for the class ....
The courts are now being forced to rethink the alterna-
tives and priorities by the current volume of litigation
215. Id. at 416-17.
216. 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
217. 109 F.R.D. 269 (E.D. Tex. 1985), afl'd, 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
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and more frequent mass disasters.2 18
The Jenkins court went on to opine that "[i]f Congress leaves
us to our own devices, we may be forced to abandon repetitive
hearings and arguments for each claimant's attorney to the
extent enjoyed by the profession in the past." 19
B. Other Federal Decisions
In addition to the seminal asbestos decisions decided by
the Fifth Circuit during the late 1970s and the first part of the
1980s,2s0 other federal courts resolved significant asbestos in-
jury claims while helping to further conceptualize toxic tort
law during this time period.
In the 1985 opinion, Lee v. Celotex Corp.,21 an Eleventh
Circuit panel held that an executrix failed to show that the
decedent had actually been exposed to the defendant manu-
facturer's products. While the plaintiff's decedent had died
from mesothelioma - an asbestos-related disease - the trial
court judge granted the defendant manufacturer's summary
judgment motion based on a lack of causation. A majority of
the panel affirmed. The appellate court noted the growing vol-
ume of asbestos litigation and concluded that there was a
need for innovative "grouping" techniques in these cases to
"systematically mov[e] a group of similar lawsuits through
court" in order to conserve scarce resources, facilitate settle-
ments, and allow parties their day in court.2 22 In observing
that the instant case was one of several other similar asbestos
cases consolidated for oral argument, the court indicated as
follows: "Brought on theories of negligence (failure to warn),
breach of implied warranty, fraudulent concealment, conspir-
acy, and strict liability, toxic tort litigation ... has many ele-
ments which must be proven by a plaintiff to obtain recov-
218. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 782 F.2d at 473.
219. Id. See also 109 F.R.D. at 281 ("Failure to formulate new procedures now
for addressing the problems in asbestos litigation will only augment problems in fu-
ture toxic tort litigation.").
220. See supra notes 180-219 and accompanying text.
221. 764 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1985).
222. Id. at 1490.
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ery. ' '2 3 Moreover, the court wrote that "[t]he major factual
issue at the summary judgment stage in asbestos litigation is
whether plaintiff was exposed to the products of the defend-
ant," and added that "[tihe major legal issue is the degree of
evidence necessary to show that exposure. '224 The court of ap-
peals, with one judge dissenting, determined that "[t]he alle-
gation that plaintiff was exposed to defendant's asbestos-con-
taining product is not supported by reasonable inferences
arising from the undisputed facts, but is based on speculation
and conjecture that renders them mere guesses or
possibilities. '22 5
Taking an opposing view of logic and of the evidence, the
dissenting judge on the Lee panel reasoned that since the
plaintiff's decedent had testified that he had seen defendant's
asbestos products at his various work sites, a reasonable infer-
ence sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment
should be available to the plaintiff notwithstanding defend-
ant's argument that the "asbestos-containing product would
not have been used in the manner described... i.e., as a seal-
ant on pipes and for patchwork on sleeves, but.., for a differ-
ent use, i.e., finishing wallboard joints. 2 26
In Menne v. Celotex Corp.227 - another mesothelioma
case involving alleged workplace exposure to asbestos prod-
ucts - the plaintiff overcame causation hurdles to win a $2.5
million jury verdict against several asbestos manufacturers
and to rebuff the defendants' post-trial motions to obtain a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, a
new trial. Defendants vigorously contested liability based on
lack of causation. Some of the defendants' arguments focused
on plaintiff's tobacco smoking, lack of exposure by plaintiff to
asbestos, and lack of exposure by plaintiff to defendants' par-
ticular products. 228 Judge Patrick Kelly, in formulating his as-
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1491 (citations omitted).
226. Id. at 1493 (Anderson, J. dissenting).
227. 641 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Kan. 1986), rev'd and remanded, 861 F.2d 1453 (10th
Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, 722 F. Supp. 662 (D. Kan. 1989).
228. Id. at 1430.
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sessment of how Nebraska substantive law would resolve the
causation issue in the diversity suit at bar, concluded that the
doctrine of alternative liability as contemplated by section
433B of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, would gov-
ern.229 According to the district court judge, the "plaintiff's
evidence shows [that] the asbestos products of each of [the]
defendants were present and used in his vicinity at the ship-
yard job site."23 0 Viewing Judge Weinstein's earlier analysis in
the Agent Orange case to be "most instructive,"2 3 1 Judge
Kelly quoted extensively from that opinion's handling of cau-
sation issues in toxic tort cases,232 while also referring to the
Fifth Circuit's use of the doctrine of alternative liability "in
appropriate and very similar asbestos cases where all the de-
fendants are before the court. '2  On appeal to the Tenth Cir-
cuit,234 however, the plaintiff's sweeping victory was partially
curtailed. Initially, the court of appeals corrected the district
court's Erie guess: Nebraska law would view the concomitant
liability of the asbestos manufacturers as joint rather than
joint and several, resulting in prorated liability by the various
defendants.3 Moreover, as an additional reason for remand-
ing the case, the Tenth Circuit construed the jury instructions
and special interrogatories concerning causation and burden
shifting as ambiguous enough to constitute significant and
prejudicial error. 6
In 1986, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Louisiana in Johnson v. Armstrong Cork Co.2 37
made a pair of important pre-trial rulings in an asbestos case
which: (1) prevented the plaintiff from introducing "state of
the art" evidence under a strict liability theory, and (2) al-
lowed the plaintiff to introduce evidence concerning his fears
229. Id. at 1431.
230. Id. at 1435 (emphasis omitted).
231. Id. (citing In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740
(E.D.N.Y. 1984)).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1438.
234. 861 F.2d 1453.
235. Id. at 1469.
236. Id. at 1470.
237. 645 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. La. 1986).
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of contracting cancer and probabilities of contracting cancer
in the future."' The court justified its first ruling by noting
that "the sheer volume, complexity and special burdens upon
the judicial system caused by asbestos cases dictates [exclu-
sion of plaintiffs state of the art evidence] under Fed. R.
Evid. 403," Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, and Fed. R. Evid. 102.239 The
district court reasoned that its ruling would reduce the costs
of litigation and the dangers of overcompensating the plain-
tiffs.2 40 Relying on a line of earlier Fifth Circuit decisions ap-
plying analogous state law on the second issue, the district
court emphasized that in order to overcome the inequities of
the single cause of action rule whereby "the plaintiff cannot
prove a future probability of his contracting cancer when his
initial trial is conducted but thereafter does contract the dis-
ease" and damage evidence, when available, is often "highly
speculative," the judiciary has "had to develop rules to deal
with cancer evidence in latent disease cases involving toxic
torts. '241 These rules attempt to strike a balance between ad-
mitting fear of cancer proof when there is evidence of "serious
mental distress" from "an actionable injury," while limiting
the evidence when the plaintiff is unable to show that it is
medically more probable than not that he will contract
cancer.
242
In a miscellany of other asbestos-related cases litigated in
the federal courts during the mid-1980s, courts upheld New
York City's asbestos removal training and certification re-
quirements, noting that "future prevention of asbestos-in-
duced diseases represents the optimal solution to the difficult
legal and policy issues" raised in toxic tort suits; 243 and, ap-
plied state toxic tort discovery rules to, respectively, deny de-
fendant's summary judgment motions in two asbestos cases
238. Id. at 766-70.
239. Id. at 768.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 769.
242. Id.
243. Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York, 666 F. Supp. 535,
547 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd in part, and rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1988).
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governed by Indiana substantive law,244 while dismissing
plaintiff's asbestosis claim under Virgin Islands law. 4"
C. State Court Decisions
During the first portion of the 1980s, a number of state
courts crafted opinions that addressed toxic tort issues in the
context of asbestos litigation. In Celotex Corp. v. Copeland,246
for example, the Supreme Court of Florida ruled on two im-
portant issues. First, the court held that a market share the-
ory of products liability was unnecessary where an asbestos
worker and his wife were able to identify a majority of manu-
facturers which supplied the material to which the worker was
exposed.2 4 7 Parenthetically, the court observed, however, that
asbestos products are fundamentally different from sub-
stances like DES which is "produced by hundreds of compa-
nies pursuant to one formula.""' 8 According to the court's rea-
soning, "[a]sbestos products, on the other hand, have widely
divergent toxicities, with some asbestos products presenting a
much greater risk of harm than others." 4 9 Indeed, "[t]his di-
vergence is caused by a combination of factors, including: the
specific type of asbestos fiber incorporated into the product;
the physical properties of the product itself; and the percent-
age of asbestos used in the product. There are six different
asbestos silicates used in industrial applications and each
presents a distinct degree of toxicity in accordance with the
shape and aerodynamics of the individual fibers." 5 ' The court
supported its reasoning by review of a majority of other deci-
sions which had rejected the application of a market share
244. Covalt v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 367 (S.D. Ind. 1987), afl'd, 894
F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1990); Blacker v. U.S. Mineral Prod. Co., 688 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D.
Ind. 1987).
245. Joseph v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 671 F. Supp. 1043 (D.V.I. 1987),
rev'd, 867 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1989).
246. 471 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1985).
247. Id. at 539.
248. Id. at 537 (emphasis omitted).
249. Id. at 538 (citation omitted).
250. Id.
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theory to asbestosis cases.2 1 Second, the Celotex court also
ruled that the questions of when asbestosis and cancer mani-
fest themselves were questions of fact not subject to resolu-
tion by summary judgment motion.2"
In Bernier v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,' 8 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine answered three legal questions which
had been certified to it by the United States District Court for
the District of Maine: (1) state-of-the-art evidence may be in-
troduced in a failure to warn case under the state products
liability statute, when a manufacturer seeks to show that it
neither knew nor reasonably could have known of the danger-
ous characteristics of the product;2 " (2) individuals can re-
cover under the Maine wrongful death statute in an action
against a manufacturer based on defectiveness of a product if
the decedent could have brought such action; 58 and (3)
Maine's statute imposing liability on a manufacturer for mar-
keting a defective, unreasonably dangerous product may be
applicable when inhalation of asbestos dust giving rise to dis-
eases and deaths occurred prior to the effective date of the
statute, but diseases were diagnosed and deaths occurred after
the date because the diseases did not manifest themselves un-
til that time. 6 In reaching its conclusions, the Maine court
relied extensively on judicial authorities characterized as
"helpful because they provide insights into the elements that
make up judicially cognizable 'toxic tort' causes of action."" 7
The Supreme Court of Michigan in Larson v. Johns-
Manville Corp.258 also faced timing problems in discerning
when wrongful death causes of action for asbestosis and can-
cer arose. The court, after discussing the complex nature of
mass toxic tort actions, held that actions for deaths of dece-
dents resulting from decedents' exposure to asbestos products,
251. Id. (citing cases).
252. Id. at 539 (citing cases).
253. 516 A.2d 534 (Me. 1986).
254. Id. at 540.
255. Id. at 540-41.
256. Id. at 544.
257. Id. at 542-43 n.7.
258. 399 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1986).
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were barred by Michigan's three-year limitations period for
products liability actions. However, the court also ruled that
the personal representatives of decedents' estates, who prior
to their deaths had developed cancer and had not brought
earlier actions for asbestosis, could bring wrongful death ac-
tions to recover for cancer damages within three years of dis-
covering, or the time the decedents should have discovered,
the cancer.259
In its 1985 opinion in Nelson v. Flintkote Co., 6 0 a panel
of the California intermediate appellate court had the occa-
sion to review the fairness of applying a special, more gener-
ous, statute of limitations for asbestos-related injuries instead
of the generic one-year limitation period. Initially, the court
emphasized that "[the state certainly has an interest in pro-
tecting innocent asbestosis victims from toxic tortfeasors"
since "[a]sbestosis may take up to 35 years to develop from
first exposure."26 1 Moreover, the court found the special as-
bestosis statute of limitations - which provided that the limi-
tation period did not begin to run until a victim discovers a
disease link with earlier asbestos exposure and actually suffers
a "disability" - to be justified based on "[pirinciples of fair-
ness and social utility."2 6 2 In addition, the California court
noted that "traditional justifications for statutes of limitations
do not apply here since there is no real problem of loss of
witness' memories" because "[a]n asbestosis manufacturer's
defense necessarily rests on documentary evidence which is
typically kept in the course of business.""' In a related way,
the court concluded that the "alleged toxic tortfeasors [can-
not] claim they were entitled to psychological protection from
surprise suits when most knew or should have known back in
the 1950s of the toxic nature of the materials they were
supplying."2 6 4
259. Id. at 9.
260. 218 Cal. Rptr. 562 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1985).
261. Id. at 566 (citation omitted).
262. Id. at 567.
263. Id. (citation omitted).
264. Id. (citing Note, The Fairness and Constitutionality of Statutes of Limita-
tions for Toxic Tort Suits, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1683, 1685 (1983)).
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In Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp.265 - a 1987 opinion
by a panel of the Arizona intermediate appellate court - a
variety of interesting damages issues were resolved. The case
involved residents of land adjacent to an asbestos-producing
mill. The residents brought suit against the mill owner for al-
leged injuries resulting from exposure to the asbestos. The Ar-
izona court made four significant holdings. First, subclinical
asbestos-related injuries were deemed insufficient to consti-
tute actual loss or damage required to support a cause of ac-
tion. Second, the court concluded that there can be no claim
for damages for fear of contracting asbestos-related diseases
in the future without manifestations of bodily injury. Third,
despite the unavailability of other damages remedies, resi-
dents could recover damages for inconvenience, discomfort
and annoyance, and for property damage resulting from as-
bestos contamination. Finally, in the most interesting and sig-
nificant part of the opinion, the Burns court held that resi-
dents were entitled to obtain compensation for medical
surveillance of development of cancer and other asbestos-re-
lated diseases. However, the court ordered that this payment
should be made by the mill owner into a court-supervised
fund rather than a lump sum award to the plaintiffs. Agreeing
with the reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Ayers
v. Township of Jackson,266 the Arizona court concluded that
''mass exposure toxic tort cases involve public interests not
present in conventional tort litigation."2 6 7
D. Bankruptcy Decisions
In two federal bankruptcy decisions decided during the
mid-1980s, bankruptcy court judges provided a fascinating
glimpse at the emerging intersections between bankruptcy law
and toxic tort liability. In the first case, In re UNR Indus-
tries, Inc.,168 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Illinois concluded that circumstances
265. 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. 1987).
266. 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987). See infra notes 278 to 322 and accompanying text.
267. 752 P.2d at 34 (quoting Ayers, 525 A.2d at 314).
268. 46 B.R. 671 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1985).
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warranted the appointment of a legal representative for puta-
tive victims of asbestos disease, in the context of an asbestos
manufacturer's proposal to convert a Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion case into a Chapter 7 liquidation. In stark and shocking
terms, the bankruptcy court described the reasons for the
bankruptcy filings:
The expense involved in defending the 17,000 asbes-
tos-related tort and wrongful death suits pending against
Debtors on July 29, 1982, had much to do with Debtors'
institution and maintenance of these bankruptcy proceed-
ings. The disposition of Debtors' potential liability to the
30,000 to 120,000 people who may contract asbestos dis-
ease through the early part of the next century could have
a decisive impact on Debtors' ability to successfully reor-
ganize ....
The liquidation of the Debtors or the failure of Debt-
ors to make provision for its potential liability to these
30,000 to 120,000 putative asbestos disease victims in a
plan or plans of reorganization, might leave these parties
without private remedy with which they, or their estates,
could obtain recovery from these debtors for their per-
sonal injuries or their wrongful death.269
Concluding that the asbestos victims "in equity, should
be heard" and that the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
were "flexible enough to permit [the court] to provide these
victims with a means to be heard,'2 0 the bankruptcy court
authorized the appointment of a legal representative in the
bankruptcy litigation for the asbestos victims. Rejecting the
argument of the Creditors' Committee that federal Bank-
ruptcy law "was not designed to address the complex
problems posed by mass toxic tort disasters,"'' 7 1 the bank-
ruptcy court reasoned that it was "charged with the responsi-
bility of applying the Bankruptcy Code under which Debtors
are attempting to reorganize, while endeavoring to insure that
269. Id. at 672-73.
270. Id. at 675.
271. Id.
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parties in interest receive fair and equitable treatment of their
claims and interests." ' Basing its decision on section 105(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code, 73 which affords a bankruptcy court
the ability to issue appropriate orders to carry out the provi-
sions of the bankruptcy laws, and section 101(4)(A) of the
Code, 2 7 which allows expansive "claim[s]" to be filed against
bankruptcy debtors, the bankruptcy court reasoned that "[i]n
this unique case, with its unique circumstances, it is necessary
for the [c]ourt to exercise its equitable authority to fashion
some kind of procedural relief for these putative asbestos dis-
ease victims. 27 5
In the 1987 case In re Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,7 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York affirmed an order of the bankruptcy court which had
confirmed the Chapter 11 reorganization plan of the asbestos
manufacturing Debtor. The district court provided the perti-
nent procedural background of the case in compelling
language:
On August 26, 1982 Johns-Manville Corporation and
affiliated entities filed petitions for reorganization pursu-
ant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. At that time
Manville faced massive toxic tort liability, arising princi-
pally from asbestos related health and property claims, as
well as the certainty of many, many more such claims in
the future. In the ensuing nearly five years, the parties
and [the] Bankruptcy Judge ... have worked with skill
and ingenuity to fashion a suitable plan of reorganization.
Such a plan must provide for the compensation of today's
asbestos victims without exhausting the resources neces-
sary to care for tomorrow's victims. It must simultane-
ously account to the different types of potential tort
plaintiffs, to creditors of Manville and to its shareholders.
272. Id. See generally Robert F. Blomquist, An Introduction to American Toxic
Tort Law: Three Overarching Metaphors and Three Sources of Law, 26 VAL. U. L.
REV. 795 (1992).
273. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988).
274. Id. § 101(4)(A).
275. 46 B.R. at 675.
276. 78 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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And it must do so within the framework of Chapter 11,
since no other vehicle exists to deal with what is said to
be the largest and most complex bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion in history.27
Based on its view of the serious tradeoffs and difficult balanc-
ing of interests required under the circumstances, the district
court affirmed the bankruptcy court's approval of the Chapter
11 reorganization plan.
IV. Environmental Exposure Cases
In a variety of cases decided during the mid-1980s, plain-
tiffs sued defendants based on allegations that they suffered
personal or property injuries from exposure to toxic sub-
stances in the ambient environment. Unlike workplace expo-
sure to potentially harmful substances27 ' or product liability
disputes involving a manufacturing or marketing problem
leading to injuries from toxic products, 279 environmental expo-
sure cases encompass an ambiguous and amorphous frame of
reference. Rather than confined to the proximity of a work
site (with regular days, hours, and places of exposure and
some expectancy of what types of substances one might en-
counter), or focused on a discernible product (with labeling,
instructions and some semblance of warning), environmental
exposure cases are usually without identifiable borders or ob-
jects. Occasionally, however, these spatial categories tend to
overlap or merge2 80 - for example, an asbestos worker may
have a claim against product manufacturers for workplace ex-
posure to asbestos dust; his family members may also have an
environmental exposure claim against product manufacturers
for their separate, residential exposure to asbestos residues on
the worker's clothing.
To further complicate attempts at classification, environ-
mental exposure cases can involve statutory and administra-
277. Id. at 408 (citations omitted).
278. See infra notes 392-425 and accompanying text.
279. See infra notes 426-43 and accompanying text.
280. See infra notes 356-69 and accompanying text.
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tive policies in juxtaposition with common law liability issues.
This is particularly true with respect to releases of hazardous
substances into the soil or water that may subject a wide class
of potentially responsible parties to what has come to be
known as "Superfund" liability under the Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980, as amended.2 81
Without a doubt, however, the most prominent and im-
portant environmental exposure case decided during this time
period was the Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision in
Ayers v. Township of Jackson2 82 - a case involving massive
groundwater contamination of a residential drinking water
supply.
Ayers involved "claims for damages sustained because
plaintiffs' well water was contaminated by toxic pollutants"
which had allegedly leached into a subterranean aquifer from
a landfill established and operated by Jackson Township.28 3
Following an extensive trial, the jury returned a verdict which
was entered as a judgment by the trial court in an amount in
excess of $15.8 million. This award provided compensation for
three distinct claims of injury: emotional distress stemming
from the plaintiffs' knowledge that they had ingested water
contaminated by toxic chemicals; deterioration in the plain-
tiffs' quality of life during the time that they were deprived of
running water; and, the future costs of regular medical sur-
veillance because of the plaintiffs' increased susceptibility to
cancer and other diseases. Liability was predicated on a find-
ing that the township had created "a 'nuisance' and a 'danger-
ous condition' by virtue of its operation of the landfill," while
acting in a "palpably unreasonable" manner, sufficient to al-
low plaintiffs' recovery under the New Jersey Tort Claims
Act.2 84
In reviewing the decision of the intermediate appellate
281. See generally, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 - 9675 (1988).
282. 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
283. Id. at 291.
284. Id. (citing various statutes to include the New Jersey Tort Claims Act,
N.J.S.A. § 59:4-2 (West 1992)).
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court, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that: (1) dam-
ages for the residents' emotional distress based on a possible
exposure to cancer-causing substances in other chemicals was
not recoverable against the township under the tort claims
statute; (2) the residents were, however, entitled to recover
damages for disruption of their "quality of life" caused by the
absence of potable water at their homes for a period of twenty
months; and (3) the residents were entitled to obtain damages
for the cost of medical surveillance based on enhanced, albeit
unquantified, risk of future diseases as a result of past expo-
sure to toxic chemicals. In the course of the majority opinion,
Justice Stein, writing for the court, engaged in a far-ranging
and probing analysis of the nature of toxic tort law, principles,
and policies. First, by way of implication, the court high-
lighted the importance of experts in toxic tort litigation by
summarizing the testimony of four expert witnesses employed
by the plaintiff leading to the substantial verdict below: a
groundwater expert who "described the probable movement
and concentration of the chemicals as they migrated from the
landfill toward plaintiffs' wells"; a toxicologist who summa-
rized the harmful characteristics of twelve chemical wastes
found in the groundwater (which included cancer-causing
chemicals and chemicals that tended to cause liver and kidney
damage); "[a]n expert in the diagnosis and treatment of dis-
eases caused by exposure to toxic substances"; and "[e]xpert
psychological testimony" addressing the impact of the plain-
tiffs' knowledge that they had ingested toxic chemicals over a
substantial period of time.28 5
A second distinctive aspect of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey's opinion in Ayers is its description of quality of life
damages with respect to invasions of an interest in land. Rely-
ing upon section 929 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
the court referred to three distinctive categories of compensa-
tion in these cases:
(a) the difference between the value of the land before the
harm and the value after the harm, or at [plaintiff's] elec-
285. 525 A.2d at 292.
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tion in an appropriate case, the cost of restoration that
has been or may be reasonably incurred;
(b) the loss of use of the land, and
(c) discomfort and annoyance to him as occupant.2 86
Thus, as reasoned by the Supreme Court of New Jersey,
the third component of damages was designed to "compen-
sate[] the plaintiff for his personal losses flowing directly from
such an invasion. "287
Third, in trenchant language that cut to the heart of the
matter, the Ayers court noted that its "evaluation of the en-
hanced risk and medical surveillance claims requires that [it]
focus on a critical issue in the management of toxic tort litiga-
tion: at what stage in the evaluation of a toxic injury should
tort law intercede by requiring the responsible party to pay
damages? '2 8 s The court provided an overview of the problems
posed by the temporality question by stating:
At the outset, we must recognize that the issues
presented by this case and others like it will be recurring.
We note the difficulty that both law and science experi-
ence in attempting to deal with the emerging complexities
of industrialized society and the consequent implications
for human health. One facet of that problem is repre-
sented here, in the form of years of inadequate and im-
proper waste disposal practices. However dimly or cal-
lously the consequences of those waste management
practices may have been perceived, those consequences
are now upon us. According to the [United States] Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works, more than
ninety percent of all hazardous chemical wastes produced
in the United States have been disposed of improperly.2 89
Upon closer examination of the question, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey lamented the absence of "a comprehen-
sive governmental [approach] to the problem of compensating
286. Id. at 294 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 (1977)).
287. Id. (citations omitted).
288. Id. at 298.
289. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980)).
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victims of toxic exposure. ' ' 90 The court noted that "[i]n addi-
tion to the staggering problem of removing - or at least con-
taining - the hazardous remnants of past practices, there re-
mains the moral and legal problem of compensating the
human victims of past misuse of chemical products. '291 In-
deed, as observed by the court, "[g]overnmental response to
the problem [has been] slow" with "Congress deliberately
ma[king] no provision for the recovery of damages for per-
sonal injury and property damage resulting from exposure to
hhzardous waste. 29 2 Notwithstanding its statutorily-man-
dated study group's 293 recommendation that a no-fault victims
compensation fund be established, similar to workers' com-
pensation laws in the states - with a right to sue in tort in
extraordinary cases where victims "could overcome the nu-
merous problems of proving injury and causation "294 - the
court opined that none of the federal study group's proposals
had been adopted by Congress. Accordingly, the Ayers tribu-
nal reluctantly concluded that "[iln the absence of statutory
or administrative mechanisms for processing injury claims re-
sulting from environmental contamination, 29 5 the only relia-
ble recourse was a judicially-driven response.
Fourth, and related to the third notable feature of the
Ayers opinion discussed above, the New Jersey Supreme
Court provided an extended and scholarly exposition of "the
array of complex practical and doctrinal problems that con-
found litigants and courts in toxic-tort" cases.2 9 According to
the Ayers majority, these problems stem from attempting "to
accommodate common-law tort doctrines to the peculiar char-
acteristics of toxic-tort litigation. 2 97 Referencing a variety of
influential law review articles that had been published during
290. Id. at 299.
291. Id. at 298.
292. Id. (citing James R. Zazzali & Frank P. Grad, Hazardous Wastes: New
Rights and Remedies? The Report and Recommendations of the Superfund Study
Group, 13 SETON HALL L. REV. 446 (1983)).
293. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e) (1988).
294. 525 A.2d at 299 (citing Zazzali and Grad, supra note 292, at 464-65).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 302.
297. Id. at 299.
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the first part of the 1980s,19 the court synthesized these
scholarly writings by observing that:
[t]he overwhelming conclusion of the commentators who
have evaluated the result is that the accommodation has
failed, that common-law tort doctrines are ill-suited to
the resolution of such injury claims, and that some form
of statutorily-authorized compensation procedure is re-
quired if the injuries sustained by victims of chemical
contamination are to be fairly addressed.2 99
The court noted the following specific difficulties inherent in
toxic tort litigation: "identification of the parties responsible
for environmental damage; the risk that responsible parties
are judgment-proof; the expense of compensating expert wit-
nesses in specialized fields such as toxicology and epidemiol-
ogy; and the strong temptation for premature settlement be-
cause of the cost and complexity of protracted multi-party
litigation." °00 Moreover, the court viewed state statutes of lim-
itations as a potential procedural obstacle to toxic tort litiga-
tion "[b]ecause of the long latency period typical of illnesses
caused by chemical pollutants [whereby] victims often dis-
cover their injury and the existence of a cause of action long
after the expiration of the personal-injury statute of limita-
tions, where the limitations period is calculated from the date
of the exposure." '01 The court pointed out, however, that this
problem had been mitigated by the "discovery rule," adopted
in New Jersey and a few other states as a matter of state tort
298. Id. (citing William R. Ginsberg & Lois Weiss, Common Law Liability for
Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 920-30 (1981); David Ro-
senberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of
the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851, 855-59 (1984); Jeffery Trauberman, Statutory
Reform of "Toxic Torts": Relieving Legal, Scientific, and Economic Burdens on the
Chemical Victim, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 188-202 (1983); Developments in the
Law - Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1602-31 (1986); Palma J.
Strand, Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental
Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 575, 581-88 (1983)).
299. 525 A.2d 299 (citations omitted; see supra note 292).
300. Id. (citations omitted).
301. Id.
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law, "that tolls the statute until the victim discovers both the
injury and the facts suggesting that a third party may be re-
sponsible, "302 coupled with the federal preemption rule under
CERCLA similar to the state-law discovery rule.303 Citing the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals precedent in the Hagerty v. L
& L Marine Services, Inc .3 4 asbestos case to resolve a related
procedural problem in toxic tort cases, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey agreed "that neither the statute of limitations nor
the single controversy rule should bar timely causes of action
in toxic-tort cases instituted after discovery of a disease or in-
jury related to tortious conduct, although there has been prior
litigation between the parties of different claims based on the
same tortious conduct."30 5 The court, also, identified the "dif-
ficulty encountered by plaintiffs in proving negligence"30 6 as
another "commonly identified obstacle to judicial resolution"
of toxic tort cases.3 01 In this regard, the court stated that "[ult
is frequently argued that a negligence standard unfairly im-
poses on plaintiffs the difficult burden of establishing by a
cost-benefit analysis that the cost to defendant of taking pre-
cautionary measures is outweighed by the probability and
gravity of harm"; 30 8 accordingly, "[a] frequent proposal [to
overcome this problem in toxic tort cases] involves the substi-
tution of strict liability doctrine in place of a negligence stan-
dard. 3 0 9 In a similar vein, the Ayers court identified proof of
causation as a recurring difficulty to judicial resolution of
toxic tort disputes. Quoting extensively from the opinion of
U.S. District Court Judge Jenkins in the Allen v. United
States310 radiation exposure case, the Supreme Court of New
302. Id. at 299-300.
303. Id. at 300 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 9658 (West Supp. 1987)).
304. 788 F.2d 315, 320-21 (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 797 F.2d 256
(5th Cir. 1986).
305. 525 A.2d at 300 (citation omitted).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 301 (citation omitted).
309. Id. (citation omitted).
310. Id. at 301-02 (quoting 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988). See supra
notes 148-79.
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Jersey complained that "[iln toxic tort cases, the task of prov-
ing causation is invariably made more complex because of the
long latency period of illnesses caused by carcinogens or other
toxic chemicals."311
A fifth notable component of the Ayers opinion is the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey's treatment of "whether ... proof
of an unquantified enhanced risk of illness or a need for medi-
cal surveillance" is compensable. s In addressing this issue,
the court observed that "[i]n view of the acknowledged diffi-
culties of proving causation once evidence of disease is mani-
fest, a determination of the compensability of post-exposure,
pre-symptom injuries is particularly important in assessing
the ability of tort law to redress the claims of plaintiffs in
toxic-tort litigation. '3 1 3 In the course of reaching its decision
on this issue, the court reviewed a number of significant cases
that had ruled on the compensability of a claim for enhanced
risk. Among the decisions considered, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey noted that the federal diversity-based toxic tort
case Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., had rejected liability,s"
in a dispute involving alleged chemical contamination in the
area of Woburn, Massachusetts. The district court in Ander-
son was mindful of "the inevitable inequity which would re-
sult if recovery were allowed" where the award "'would signif-
icantly undercompensate those who actually do develop
cancer and would be a windfall to those who do not'." '15
Among competing decisions considered by the Ayers court,
311. Id. at 301.
The fact that ten or twenty years or more may intervene between the expo-
sure and the manifestation of disease highlights the practical difficulties en-
countered in the effort to prove causation. Moreover, the fact that segments
of the entire population are afflicted by cancer and other toxically induced
diseases requires plaintiffs, years after their exposure, to counter the argu-
ment that other intervening exposures or forces were the "cause" of their
injury.
Id.
312. Id. at 302.
313. Id. at 302-03.
314. Id. at 306 (citing 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986)).
315. Id. (quoting 628 F. Supp. at 1232).
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the justices cited Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services, Inc.316
and Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.3 17 as precedent for al-
lowing a cause of action for enhanced risk of disease based on
toxic exposure where the enhanced risk could be established
with reasonable probability. Importantly, the Ayers court rec-
ognized "that the overwhelming weight of the scholarship on
this issue favors a right of recovery for tortious conduct that
causes a significantly enhanced risk of injury."318 However, in
reconciling these divergent cases and opposing policy con-
cerns, the court concluded that "the speculative nature of an
unquantified enhanced risk claim, the difficulties inherent in
adjudicating such claims, and the policies underlying the
[state] Tort Claims Act argue persuasively against the recog-
nition of this cause of action."319
A sixth feature of the Ayers decision - distinct but re-
lated to the question of actionability for enhanced risk - is
the Supreme Court of New Jersey's treatment of the plain-
tiffs' claim for medical surveillance. As characterized by the
court, "[tihe claim for medical surveillance expenses stands
on a different footing from the claim based on enhanced
risk."320 A medical surveillance claim "seeks to recover the
cost of periodic medical examinations intended to monitor
plaintiffs' health and facilitate early diagnosis and treatment
of disease caused by plaintiffs' exposure to toxic chemicals." '
After an exhaustive analysis of contending policy considera-
tions, the court concluded by "hold[ing] that the cost of medi-
316. Id. (citing Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 319).
317. Id. at 307 (citing 647 F. Supp. 303, 321-22 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), rev'd in part,
855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988)).
318. Id. (citing some of the sources in note 292, supra, as well as the following:
Fournier J. Gale & James L. Goyer, Recovery for Cancerphobia and Increased Risk
of Cancer, 15 CuMB. L. REV. 723 (1985); Mark D. Seltzer, Note, Personal Injury Haz-
ardous Waste Litigation: A Proposal for Tort Reform, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
797 (1982-1983); Barton C. Legum, Note, Increased Risk of Cancer as an Actionable
Injury, 18 GA. L. REV. 563 (1984); Brent Carson, Note, Increased Risk of Disease
from Hazardous Waste: A Proposal for Judicial Reform, 60 WASH. L. REV. 635
(1985)).
319. Id. at 308.
320. Id.
321. Id.
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cal surveillance is a compensable item of damages where the
proofs demonstrate, through reliable expert testimony predi-
cated upon the significance and extent of exposure to chemi-
cals, the toxicity of the chemicals, the seriousness of the dis-
eases for which individuals are at risk, the relative increase in
the chance of onset of disease to those exposed, and the value
of early diagnosis, that such surveillance to monitor the effect
of exposure to toxic chemicals is reasonable and necessary. '3 22
Significantly, the court found that "this holding is thoroughly
consistent with our rejection of plaintiffs' claim for damages
based on their enhanced risk of injury. '.23 Yet, in scrutinizing
the advisability of a lump-sum damage award for medical sur-
veillance, the court found it advisable to employ a "court-su-
pervised fund," as had been utilized in the Agent Orange
Litigation.124
Justice Handler filed a separate opinion in Ayers, concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part. According to the dissent,
the majority in Ayers "afford[ed] the victims of tortious toxic
exposure significantly less protection than it would plaintiffs
in other tort actions, 3 2 by "exaggerat[ing] the difficulties of
recovering [a] cause of action [for enhanced risk] and
minimiz[ing] the imperative to provide fair compensation for
seriously injurious wrongs. "326 In Justice Handler's view, ex-
posure to toxic chemicals had already caused actual injury to
plaintiffs since "exposure to highly toxic chemicals [consti-
tutes] the 'infliction of . . . harm', 'an invasion of a legally
protected interest'," as provided in the RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS.3 27 Indeed, he concluded his dissent by empha-
sizing that "[tihe citizens of Jackson Township endured ex-
tended exposure to serious toxic chemicals because of the
township's palpably unreasonable misconduct. Their injuries
322. Id. at 312.
323. Id. at 312-13.
324. Id. at 313-14 (citing, inter alia, In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611
F. Supp. 1396, 1399 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), a/Pd, 818 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
487 U.S. 1234 (1988)). See supra notes 14-147 and accompanying text.
325. 525 A.2d at 316 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
326. Id. at 317.
327. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(1) and comment a (1965)).
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are substantial - as real and as readily measurable as other
injuries for which the courts allow compensation . . . . The
majority's decision to grant only a limited portion of full com-
pensation disrespects what the plaintiffs have had to go
through." 328
Judge Richard Posner wrote the panel opinion for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the
1986 decision, Backes v. Valspar Corp.2" 9 - another ground-
water contamination case involving a suit by a father against a
paint manufacturer, which had stored chemical wastes on ad-
joining land. The father alleged that these hazardous sub-
stances had caused a variety of medical problems to be suf-
fered by his three children, who had consumed well water
tainted by paint wastes. The children's medical problems in-
cluded: abnormal levels of lead in the bloodstream of one
child; an ovarian condition and abscessed appendix in an-
other; and, learning disabilities by a third child. Interestingly,
"[t]he children's health and mental acuity improved after
they moved away."330 Dennis Johnson - a chemist formerly
employed by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency -
submitted an affidavit on behalf of the plaintiff indicating
that phenolic wastes, from drums stored by the paint manu-
facturer, had polluted the plaintiff's drinking well beneath his
land. Among other information before the district court, prior
to its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Valspar,
the paint manufacturer, revealed that the stored paint wastes
on defendant's property contained "phenols, lead, mercury,
and other materials hazardous to human health." 3 1
Basing its decision to grant summary judgment in the
paint manufacturer's favor on a dearth of competent evidence
about the probable origin of the children's diseases, the trial
court judge reasoned that Johnson's affidavit was legally in-
sufficient to create a triable issue of fact. In reversing, the
court of appeals stressed the burden on the paint manufac-
328. 788 F.2d at 321.
329. 783 F.2d 77 (7th Cir. 1986).
330. Id. at 78.
331. Id. (citations omitted).
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turer "to show that the outcome of a trial would be a foregone
conclusion." 332 Concluding that the proper showing had not
been made by the defendant, the Seventh Circuit made a
number of significant observations about the nature of causa-
tion proof in toxic tort litigation. First, the appellate court
noted that nonphysicians were as competent as physicians to
testify about the effects of harmful substances or forces on the
human body.338 Indeed, the court pointed out that in the case
at bar, plaintiff's chemist "may... be more competent to give
such an opinion than [a] doctor" because a treating physician
would have been unaware of the children drinking contami-
nated water and - once the children stopped drinking the
bad water - it would be useless to obtain a medical examina-
tion because any toxic substances would probably "have been
metabolized and have disappeared" after causing health in-
jury.3 4 A second significant point articulated by Judge Posner
for the court, was the persuasiveness of circumstantial causa-
tion evidence in toxic tort litigation - at least at the sum-
mary judgment stage. In a portion of the opinion worthy of
full exposition, the court reasoned as follows:
If Dennis Johnson's affidavit were incredible, this
would be grounds for deeming him unqualified to give an
opinion. But it is not incredible. Although unscientific
people (judges and jurors for example) may give too much
weight to mere coincidence, see e.g., Tversky &
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristic and
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 3 (Kahneman,
Slovic & Tversky eds. 1982), the [plaintiffs] children did
experience an unusual concentration of ailments while
drinking water from wells that may well have been con-
taminated; and though it may all just be a giant coinci-
dence, Dennis Johnson's affidavit, plausibly, suggests not.
Although the wording of the affidavit is rather mealy-
mouthed, it attests to a causal relationship with enough
332. Id. at 79.
333. Id. (citing see, e.g., Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129,
1136 (5th Cir. 1985); Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en
banc)).
334. Id. at 79-80.
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definitiveness to resist summary judgment.335
Finally, the court of appeals in Valspar contrasted the
relatively lax summary judgment standard with the more rig-
orous quality of causation evidence - "a reasonable cer-
tainty" - the plaintiff would have to meet at trial. Pointing
out that "a reasonable certainty is not a certainty," the court
went on to warn "of the formidable difficulties of proving cau-
sation in toxic-waste cases,"33 concluding that it was "skepti-
cal" that the plaintiff could persuade a jury that Valspar was
a cause of the children's illnesses "without mounting a more
formidable scientific . . . case than he seems prepared to do
99337
The U.S. magistrate's recommended decision to the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas in Chaplin v. Exxon Co. 38 illustrates how environmen-
tal regulatory issues stemming from federal statutory law in-
tersect with common law causes of action in many toxic tort
cases. The scope of the Chaplin litigation was broad, combin-
ing allegations of environmental exposure with occupational
exposure. As referenced in the class action complaint, plain-
tiffs consisted of "all individuals and business entities who or
which reside, work, use, or own property or do business, or in
the past have resided, worked, used, or owned property or did
business in or about the eastern half of Harris County, Texas.
... .," The action named forty-four defendants which con-
sisted of generators and transporters of allegedly "highly dan-
gerous noxious, frightening and toxic substances at various
waste disposal sites and dump sites in the eastern half of Har-
ris County," in addition to various governmental entities.340
The first four counts of the complaint alleged violations by
335. Id. at 80.
336. Id. (citing, e.g. Rosenberg, supra note 292, at 855-59; Ginsberg & Weiss,
supra note 292, at 922-23 (emphasis omitted)).
337. Id. (citing Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic
Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732 (1984)).
338. 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2009 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
339. Id. at 2010.
340. Id. at 2010-11.
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defendants of seven federal environmental statutes: the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act, 41 the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 43 the Clean Air Act, 34 the Safe
Drinking Water Act,3 45 the Toxic Substances Control Act,"
and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act.-4 7 Subsequent far-flung counts alleged a panoply of state
law claims "including negligence in the conduct of an ultra-
hazardous activity, negligence per se, reckless and wanton
misconduct, strict liability or nuisance per se in the operation
of an ultra-hazardous or abnormally dangerous activity, nui-
sance, trespass, manufacturer and distributor product liabil-
ity, assault and battery, taking of plaintiffs' property and
health by eminent domain and/or inverse condemnation and a
general allegation under 'state and federal common law.'348
The magistrate's opinion in Chaplin viewed the linchpin
of the defendants' motion to dismiss as whether plaintiffs had
properly alleged any viable claims under federal statutory law.
Focusing on the CERCLA private cause of action allegations,
the court concluded that since the plaintiffs had not "affirma-
tively demonstrate[d] that [they] ha[d] incurred necessary
costs of response," 4 " and had failed to adequately allege re-
sponse costs that were consistent with the National Contin-
gency Plan,6 0 dismissal was appropriate. Regarding the six re-
maining statutory claims which were asserted as "citizen suit"
complaints in the nature of private attorneys general ac-
tions, 51 the court concluded that since requisite notice had
341. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 - 9675 (Supp. 1992).
342. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 - 6992k (1988).
343. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 - 1387 (Supp. 1992).
344. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 - 7671q (1983).
345. 42 U.S.C. § 300(f)-(j) (1986).
346. 15 U.S.C. § 2601 - 2671 (Supp. 1992).
347. 7 U.S.C. § 13 6 -13 6y (1988).
348. 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2011.
349. Id. at 2013 (citations omitted).
350. Id.
351. See generally, Robert F. Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as Prosecutor
Model of Environmental Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act: Some Over-
looked Problems of Outcome-Independent Values, 22 GA. L. REV. 337 (1988).
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not been afforded of these claims, plaintiffs had failed to al-
lege specific statutory violations and ongoing violations.352 Ac-
cordingly, these counts were also dismissed. With the federal
claims cleared out of the way, the Chaplin court dismissed the
various pendent common law tort theories.s53 In the course of
making this determination, the magistrate noted that "plain-
tiffs will suffer no prejudice from this dismissal as remedies
are available to them in state court under state law" and
"[i]ndeed, plaintiffs [in fact] have instituted an action in state
court... which has many of the same parties. 3 54 Contrasting
the "much-publicized 'toxic tort' case Anderson v. W.R.
Grace"355  then pending in federal district court in Boston
- the Chaplin court observed that the diversity basis of An-
derson was unavailable to the plaintiffs in the case at bar.
In the 1987 opinion in Brown v. Southeastern Pennsylva-
nia Transportation Authority,56 the federal district court
judge denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification "on a va-
riety of theories for personal and economic injuries arising
from defendants' handling, use, and storage of
polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") at the Paoli railyard in
Paoli, Pennsylvania. 3 5 7 In a factual context which combined
alleged environmental exposures by surrounding residences
and businesses with occupational exposures by railroad work-
ers, the court - quoting Judge Weinstein's dictum in a 1984
Agent Orange opinion3 58 - characterized plaintiffs' request
352. 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2014-15.
353. Id. at 2015.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 2012 n.6 (citing Anderson v. W.R. Grace, CA 82-1672-S). See gener-
ally Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1987).
356. Civ. A. Nos. 86-2229, 86-4037, 86-5886, 1987 WL 9273 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9,
1987). See also related litigation in what has generally become known as the "Paoli
R.R. Yard PCB Litig.": United States v. Southeastern Penn. Transp. Auth., 24 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1860 (E.D. Pa. 1986); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 706 F.
Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1988), rev'd, 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, and cert.
denied, sub. nom. General Elec. Co. v. Knight, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991); In re Paoli
R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 1989 WL 86932 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
357. 1987 WL 9273, at *1.
358. A.O., 597F. Supp. 740, 842 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (2d Cir. 1988). See supra notes 14-179 and accom-
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for class treatment of suits as "[i]n a broad sense . . . re-
present[ing] the latest frontier in the emerging area of law
dealing with 'the vexing problems of toxic torts.' ",' The
court continued its analysis by stating that "[c]ourts faced
with mass tort class actions must address two obstacles": (1)
the provisions of "Rule 23 are at odds with the individual cau-
sation and damage issues that arise in a mass tort context"; s
and (2) "establishing a fair and efficient method of adjudicat-
ing these claims is a task peculiar to the legislative branch." ''
Acknowledging that "in special circumstances, the judiciary
must devise effective and equitable means for adjudicating
mass tort claims, 3 62 the court heeded scholarly caution that it
should "hesitate before attempting to 'shoehorn mass-tort
cases into Rule 23 requirements.' "363 In reaching its decision
to deny class certification in the PCB contamination case, the
federal district court recited the complex factual background
of the case which included EPA surveillance and testing for
contamination at the site and the surrounding area, proposed
listing of the site on the Superfund's National Priorities List,
and a variety of proposed classes entailing an economic harm
class, medical monitoring class, nuisance abatement class, and
a punitive damages class.3 64 Contrasting the common factual
issues raised in the Agent Orange Litigation, asbestos cases, 65
and the In re Three Mile Island Litigation,66 the court raised
"causation problems and other related factors [that] render
[the PCB case] unsuitable for class treatment. 3 67 As noted by
the court, "plaintiffs can point to no single set of operative
panying text.
359. 1987 WL 9273, at *1 (citation omitted).
360. Id. (footnote omitted).
361. Id. (case citation omitted; citing Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the
Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure Act, 64 TEx. L. REv. 1039, 1044
(1986)).
362. 1987 WL 9273, at *1 (case citations omitted; citing Spencer Williams, Mass
Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone, 98 F.R.D. 323, 325 (1982)).
363. Id. (citing Mullenix, supra note 361, at 1049).
364. Id. at *2.
365. See generally supra notes 180 to 271, and accompanying text.
366. 87 F.R.D. 433 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
367. 1987 WL 9273, at *10.
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facts to establish liability. This case is unlike an airplane
crash, a hotel disaster, or a cruise ship food poisoning. The
alleged harm from PCBs occurred over a period of at least ten
years under a variety of circumstances and to various de-
grees."3 8 Of further concern to the court in granting class cer-
tification was that "each plaintiff will bring a unique medical
history that will provide the basis for his or her individual
claim."3 6 9
In Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc.,370 various
residents of Dowagiac, Michigan alleged that they had "suf-
fered severe injuries from exposure to various toxic chemicals
leaked from a manufacturing plant, '3 7 1 operated in their town
by the defendant manufacturer. "Since the 1950s," according
to the plaintiffs' allegations, "defendant has been operating a
plant in Dowagiac that manufactures copper and aluminum
air conditioning coils and condenser units. During the manu-
facturing process, defendant uses various industrial chemicals.
One of these chemicals is trichloroethylene ("TCE"), which
defendant employs as a metal degreasing agent. 3 72 According
to the evidence in the summary judgment record before the
court, large quantities of TCE had entered plaintiffs' drinking
water due to the defendant's failure to properly dispose of
waste substances. Referring to exposures to TCE in excess of
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's recommended
limitation, plaintiffs contended that they
suffer[ed] 'a depreciation in the market value of their
property, loss of the use and enjoyment of their property
and severe and permanent injury and damage to their
physical health, severe depression over a fear of cancer, as
well as humiliation, anxiety, mortification, anguish, emo-
tional distress, outrage and a loss of society and compan-
ionship from fellow family members .. . .
368. Id. (footnote omitted; citation omitted).
369. Id. (citations omitted).
370. 660 F. Supp. 1516 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
371. Id. at 1517.
372. Id.
373. Id. (citing Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint).
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On the defendant's motion for a partial summary judg-
ment, the Stites court held that: (1) the residents failed to
demonstrate the existence of sufficient facts showing a triable
issue that they had an increased risk of acquiring cancer in
the future, but (2) the residents could, however, proceed to
trial on their claim for emotional distress due to their fear of
incurring cancer in the future. The principal basis for the
court's granting the defendant's partial summary judgment on
the increased risk claim was that "none of plaintiffs' experts
were able to quantify the enhanced cancer risk plaintiffs face
because of their exposure to TCE. ''3 ' Referring to Michigan's
standard for judging enhanced risk claims, the district court
stated that it "appreciates the difficulty of quantifying plain-
tiffs' enhanced risk of cancer, particularly given that plaintiffs
were exposed to several other chemicals that also may be car-
cinogenic. Yet plaintiffs were unable to establish that they
have anything near a reasonable certainty of getting cancer in
the future. 3 7 5 Indeed, plaintiffs' experts had discussed a gen-
eral concern about plaintiffs' future susceptibility to cancer.
However, the most specific diagnosis afforded by any of the
plaintiffs' experts was limited to the assertion by Dr. Bertram
Carnow - an expert in the fields of occupational and environ-
mental medicine - who had stated that, based on his exami-
nation of plaintiffs, the plaintiffs were "'suffering from
chronic systemic chemical poisoning as a result of absorption
into their bodies of trichloroethylene (TCE) and other haloge-
nated hydrocarbons with damage to and dysfunction of major
organs and organ systems resulting in many cases in serious
medical problems.' ",376 But, in the court's view, even the
Carnow affidavit was insufficient proof for the plaintiffs to
meet the "reasonable certainty" standard required by Michi-
gan law.377 Moreover, notwithstanding plaintiffs' apparent ex-
posure to TCE levels in excess of EPA's drinking water stan-
dards, the court concluded that it was "not concerned with
374. Id. at 1524.
375. Id. at 1524-25.
376. Id. at 1521 (quoting Carnow Affidavit at 4).
377. Id. at 1525.
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regulatory standards .. . important as they are, but rather
must base its decision on the Michigan legal standard." 78 In
reaching its conclusion that partial summary judgment on the
enhanced risk of cancer claims should be decided against
plaintiffs, the court relied on the persuasive reasoning con-
tained in two opinions decided by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: Hagerty v. L. & L. Marine Ser-
vices, Inc.7 9 and Jackson v. Johns-Manville. Sales Corp.3 80
The Stites court's disposition of the plaintiffs' fear of
cancer claim was more indulgent. Noting that this claim was
"more difficult to resolve" than the enhanced risk claim,38' the
federal trial court judge articulated the appropriate standard
under Michigan law in this diversity suit to be as follows:
"Plaintiffs can recover for physical injury 'produced as a re-
sult of emotional distress proximately caused by defendant's
negligent conduct' if such injury is 'definite and objective.' "82
The court concluded that plaintiffs' proof in the summary
judgment record was "sufficient to create a genuine factual is-
sue on the extent and definiteness of plaintiffs' fears and re-
sulting physical injuries.' ' 383 Similarly, relying on Anderson v.
W.R. Grace & Co., the Stites court held that "whether plain-
tiffs' fears are reasonable, and whether they are proximately
linked to plaintiffs' exposure to TCE [trichloroethylene], also
are issues for the jury to decide. 3 8 4 Therefore, the court al-
378. Id. (citing GARY Z. NOTHSTEIN, Toxic TORTS: LITIGATION OF HAZARDOUS SUB-
STANCE CASES § 16.06 (1984)). In the course of the court's analysis, it also referred to
the indeterminacy of various TCE epidemiological studies, including the Woburn,
Massachusetts study involved in Anderson v. W.R. Grace, supra note 349, which
found "a 'positive association between ... exposure [to water containing TCE] and
the incidence rate of childhood leukemia,' but indicated that such exposure did not
account entirely for the increased number of leukemia cases in Woburn and that the
study could not quantify the enhanced risk of cancer Woburn's residents face due to
their exposure to TCE." Id. at 1526 (citing Woburn Epidemiological Study).
379. 788 F.2d at 319.
380. 781 F.2d 394, 413 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022
(1986).
381. 660 F. Supp. at 1526.
382. Id. (citations omitted; quoting Michigan case law).
383. Id.
384. Id. (citing Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1228 (D. Mass.
1986)).
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lowed the plaintiffs' fear of cancer claim to stand for trial.
Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County 85 involved a
suit by a private water company against the county govern-
ment. The water company sought to recover costs it claimed
had been or would be incurred as a result of the release or
threatened release of hazardous substances from a landfill
owned by the county, on the ground that such costs were "re-
sponse costs" 8 under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).3 87 In the
course of ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment,
joined with the county's motion to dismiss, the district court
judge held that - consistent with section 107(a) of CER-
CLA388 - the water company could recover against the
county for $60,000 worth of monitoring and evaluation ex-
penses incurred, which were consistent with the National
Contingency Plan. However, all other costs were not covered
by CERCLA, according to the court's reasoning. 89 Artesian's
unrecoverable costs included claims for: (1) $600,000 as com-
pensation for the loss of capacity of its wells since pumping
restrictions were imposed by the state in 1973; (2) $1 million,
representing the differential cost of obtaining alternative
water; and (3) $9 million, representing the cost of obtaining
permanent alternative water supplies.390 In an important and
trenchant concluding paragraph to its opinion, the Artesian
Water Company court compared and contrasted the limited
congressional policies underlying CERCLA private cost recov-
ery actions with the expansive potentialities of toxic tort suits:
I am aware the result of this case presents a superficial
anomaly: the County, responsible for a release of hazard-
ous substances that causes Artesian to suffer significant
economic losses, nevertheless is not required to pay full
compensation. This outcome, however, amply demon-
385. 659 F. Supp. 1269 (D. Del. 1987), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988).
386. Id. at 1274.
387. 42 U.S.C. § 9601.
388. Id. § 9607(a) (1988).
389. 659 F. Supp. at 1276-77.
390. Id. at 1276.
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strates the difference between an action for response costs
under CERCLA and an action for damages in tort. Limit-
ing recovery of the costs of providing alternative water
supplies to cases of actual or threatened contamination of
the existing water supply ensures that responsible parties
will be liable under CERCLA only for necessary costs of
response. Permitting recovery in any other circumstances
would invite suits for a broad range of economic losses
and ultimately transform CERCLA into a toxic tort stat-
ute. Congress did not intend for CERCLA, a narrowly
drawn federal remedy, to make injured parties whole or
to be a general vehicle for toxic tort actions. Unless Con-
gress sees fit to provide such a remedy, full compensation
for hazardous waste harms will in most instances remain
the province of state law. 91
V. Occupational Exposure Cases
During the early to mid-1980s, a variety of toxic tort
cases revolved around occupational exposure fact patterns. In
Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 92 for example, a class of work-
ers at a business adjacent to a radiopharmaceutical processing
plant brought negligence, assault and battery, and strict lia-
bility claims against the plant operator based on injuries they
allegedly suffered as a result of exposure to radioactive emis-
sions released by the plant. In reviewing a broad-based dis-
missal order entered by the trial court, the Missouri interme-
diate appellate court reversed and substantially reinstated the
lawsuit, holding that: (1) the suit was not barred by the fed-
eral preemption doctrine; (2) the political question doctrine
was inapplicable to the controversy; and (3) a theory of strict
liability could be applicable to claims based on radiation dam-
age. 98 However, the court also dismissed portions of the com-
plaint that alleged emotional distress from the prospect of in-
391. Id. at 1299-1300 (emphasis added).
392. 698 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. App. 1985), trans. denied, cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1176
(1986).
393. Id. at 857.
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curring cancer due to exposure to radiation. 9' In dismissing
this part of the suit, the court criticized the plaintiffs' vague
allegations while obliquely alluding to the "complex and for-
midable problems of proof" entailed in toxic tort actions for
emotional distress due to exposure to harmful substances.395
The heart of the legal questions presented in Bennett was
the issue of federal preemption. Citing a body of United
States Supreme Court decisions, the court observed that the
pertinent legislative history indicated that "Congress had no
intention of forbidding states from providing tort remedies for
injuries caused by nuclear radiation."3 96 Focusing on the spe-
cific facts at bar, the court concluded, in poignant terms, that
"[o]n the present record, payment of damages and compliance
with federal [nuclear] standards are clearly possible. Mallinc-
krodt can continue to meet federal standards, and, if found
wanting by state standards, [can] simply pay the piper. ' '1 97
Acknowledging that "there is tension between the conclusion
that safety regulation is the exclusive concern of the federal
law and the conclusion that a state may nevertheless award
damages based on its own law of liability," the court noted
that "Congress intended to stand by both concepts and to tol-
erate whatever tension there was between them."' 98
Turning to the political question doctrine, the court,
while recognizing that "[tihe propriety of nuclear related ac-
tivities is a political question properly committed to the legis-
lative and executive branches of our government," also con-
cluded that "individual tort recoveries stemming from those
activities normally are not precluded by the political question
doctrine." 99 With regard to strict liability, the Missouri ap-
pellate court, in a case of first impression in that jurisdiction,
decided to adopt the principles of abnormally dangerous ac-
394. Id. at 866-67.
395. Id. at 867 (citing Nothstein, supra note 378, § 16.05-.11).
396. 698 S.W.2d at 858 (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238
(1984); referring to Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (by way of analytical background)).
397. Id. at 860.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 864.
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tivities addressed in sections 519 and 520 of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS and to apply these principles "to claims
based on radiation damage. 4 0 0 Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that plaintiffs properly pleaded a claim for relief based
on strict liability, while noting in passing that "[theories of
liability other than strict liability may serve society better in
resolving issues between parties when normal danger is in-
volved [but] [t]hese theories are not equally effective in the
nuclear industry.' 40 1
In its 1986 decision in Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical
Co.,402 the Supreme Court of Michigan wrestled with the is-
sues of whether the state workers' compensation statute
barred an employee from "commencing a civil action against
his employer where the employee alleges (1) that the em-
ployer committed an intentional tort against the employee,
and (2) that the employer breached its contract to provide a
safe work place.'40 3 Beauchamp involved a plaintiff who was
employed for two years as a research chemist by Dow. After
applying for workers' compensation benefits, "alleging impair-
ment of normal bodily functions caused by exposure to
tordon, 2, 4-D, and 2, 4, 5-T ('agent orange'),'' Ronald
Beauchamp and his wife brought a civil suit against Dow, al-
leging personal injuries and loss of consortium, respectively.
The complaint alleged that Dow had intentionally misrepre-
sented and fraudulently concealed potential damages of plain-
tiff's chemical workplace and that Dow had, also, intentionally
assaulted Beauchamp, intentionally inflicted emotional dis-
tress, and breached its contract to provide a safe workplace.0 5
In partially reversing a summary judgment entered by the
trial court in Dow's favor on all counts of the complaint, the
Supreme Court of Michigan concluded that "actions for inten-
tional torts are not barred" since the Michigan legislature
"did not intend 'that the exclusive remedy sanction of the
400. Id. at 867.
401. Id. at 868.
402. 398 N.W.2d 882 (Mich. 1986).
403. Id. at 883.
404. Id.
405. Id.
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[workers' compensation] act be construed to preclude a plain-
tiff's recovery for injuries suffered in an intentional tort.' "1406
Notwithstanding its ruling, the Beauchamp court was
concerned with the problems of proving intent in the unique
setting of toxic tort injuries suffered in the workplace. In ex-
plaining this difficulty, given the "substantial certainty" test
of intent, the court stated:
The problem with the substantial certainty test is that it
is difficult to draw the line between substantial certainty
and substantial risk. In applying the substantial certainty
test, some courts have confused intentional, reckless, and
even negligent misconduct, and therefore blurred the line
between intentional and accidental injuries. The true in-
tentional tort standard keep [sic] the distinction clear. 07
In a footnote amplifying this observation, the court continued
its analysis as follows:
Still a further complication is the possible difference be-
tween the standard or definition of intentional tort and
the evidence that would constitute a prima facie case.
The question presented is a subset of a larger prob-
lem which the Legislature has failed to address, namely,
compensation for a nondisabling injury, that is, an injury
that does not affect the employees' ability to work - for
example, sterilization, impotency, disfigurement. It would
be appropriate for the Legislature to address this larger
problem and general liability for toxic tort injury which
is different in kind from a punch in the nose. The inten-
tional tort standards governing liability for punches in
the nose are not readily transferred to toxic torts."0 8
Alluding to a recent Illinois criminal case, People v. Film
Recovery Systems, Inc.,40 9 where corporate officers had been
406. Id. at 886-87 (citation omitted).
407. Id. at 893 (footnote omitted).
408. Id. n.69 (emphasis added).
409. Id. at 892 (citing Gareth C. Leviton, Policy Considerations in Corporate
Criminal Prosecutions After People v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc., 1986 Nat'l Insti-
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convicted of involuntary manslaughter for exposing foreign-
speaking workers to hydrogen cyanide gas used in the process
of recovering silver from film negatives, the Beauchamp court
opined that in such toxic substance fact patterns, where a
worker seeks to pursue an intentional tort remedy, a strict in-
terpretation of the "intent" requirement would "allow [ ] em-
ployers to injure and even kill employees and suffer only
workers' compensation damages so long as the employer did
not specifically intend to hurt the worker. '410 This was unac-
ceptable to the court, for social policy reasons, because
"[p]rohibiting a civil action in such a case 'would allow a cor-
poration to 'cost-out' an investment decision to kill work-
ers.' "411 Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Michigan stressed
that in "an effort to avoid the misapplication of [the substan-
tial certainty] test," the meaning of "substantial certainty
should not be equated with substantial likelihood.'14 2
The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan in Allor v. Amicon Corp.13 partially remanded an
action that had been removed by the defendants to federal
court. The litigation involved a suit by numerous employees
against their employers, charging that the employers had
made fraudulent misrepresentations as to the safety of the
workplace. Other defendants included the manufacturers and
distributors of various toxic substances to which the plaintiffs
were allegedly exposed.' The district court held that the por-
tion of the complaint alleging that the plaintiffs' employers
had tortiously exposed their employees to toxic substances re-
quired interpretation of the contractual terms of a collective
bargaining agreement and was, thereby, preempted by federal
labor law, and properly removable to federal court.415 How-
ever, the court remanded the remaining allegations against
tute on Workers' Compensation, A Review of Costs, Emerging Developments and
Remedies at 186).
410. 398 N.W.2d at 893.
411. Id. (footnote omitted; citations omitted).
412. Id.
413. 631 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
414. Id. at 328-29.
415. Id. at 328-31.
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the toxic substances manufacturers, deeming it inappropriate
to exercise pendent jurisdiction where complete diversity did
not exist.41 6 In support of its decision to remand the counts
directed at the manufacturers, the court reasoned that a "mix
of federal and state claims, with different standards and law
being applied depending upon who the defendant is would
certainly be confusing to the jury. In addition, the area of
mass toxic tort litigation is a new and unsettled area of state
law, and it is prudent to leave the development of this law to
the state courts. 4 1 7
In Brewer v. Monsanto Corp.,4 1 employees and family
members brought suit against successive owners of an elec-
tronic component plant, based on allegations of contamination
of the plant site by toxic chemicals. The key issues faced by
the district court, on motions to dismiss filed by two of the
three defendants, were whether the action was barred by Ten-
nessee's workers' compensation exclusivity provision and
whether the plaintiffs stated a cause of action against the
prior owner of the site for nuisance. On the first major issue,
the court determined that a civil tort action was not pre-
cluded by the state workers' compensation statute. On the
second major question, the court held that the employees and
family members stated a nuisance cause of action against the
prior plant owner, referencing a book on toxic torts for the
proposition that "[a] prior owner who has created a nuisance
does not escape liability simply by selling the property."1 9 As
additional policy support for this ruling, the court cited CER-
CLA whereby "past owners may be held liable if they were
partially responsible for hazardous substance
contamination. "420
416. Id. at 331-35.
417. Id. at 334. In a footnote in support of this assertion, the court noted "[flor
example, Michigan law is conflicting as to the accrual date of toxic tort causes of
action for the purpose of the running of the statute of limitations." Id. n.8 (noting
split in Michigan decisions between date of injury and date of discovery).
418. 644 F. Supp. 1267 (M.D. Tenn. 1986).
419. Id. at 1278 (citing GARY Z. NOTHSTEIN, Theories of Liability in Toxic
TORTS: LITIGATION OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES CASES 326 (1984)).
420. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601).
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed an inten-
tional occupational exposure toxic tort case in Vispisiano v.
Ashland Chemical Co.421 That case involved a former toxic-
waste disposal site employee who brought an action against
suppliers, processors, manufacturers, and distributors of toxic
waste materials. John Vispisiano alleged personal injury from
exposure to these substances. The trial court issued summary
judgment for the defendants on the basis of the statute of
limitations; the intermediate appellate court affirmed. On cer-
tification, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that, given
Vispisiano's history of migraine headaches, the role of stress
in causing these ailments, the fact that the medication played
a part in the cure, and that his migraines stopped after he left
employment at the toxic waste facility was insufficient to
place him on notice that exposure to chemicals might have
caused his symptoms.
In examining the dynamics of the "discovery rule" in
toxic tort litigation, the New Jersey Supreme Court engaged
in the following probing and comprehensive analysis:
Among the factors to which courts look in deciding
whether a plaintiff is equitably entitled to the benefit of
the "discovery rule" are the nature of the injury and the
difficulty inherent in discovering certain types of injuries.
.. In the typical toxic tort situation those obviously in-
terrelated factors may radically alter the balance of
interests.
Toxic tort victims do not become aware of their inju-
ries until decades after the tortious act. Thus, not simply
the occasional plaintiff, but instead an entire class of
plaintiffs is deprived of its claims by a toxic tort statute
of limitations that bars suit before injuries so much as
manifest themselves. Such a deprivation cannot be justi-
fied on the traditional ground that the victims "slept on
their rights," until after their claims were barred. Nor can
a toxic tortfeasor demand psychological protection from
"surprise" suits brought against him decades after the
tortious act when, like many asbestos manufacturers in
421. 527 A.2d 66 (N.J. 1987).
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the 1950s, he was or should have been aware that he was
exposing others to a substance that would cause a statisti-
cally predictable incidence of latent disease."'
From a policy standpoint, the Vispisiano court went on
to observe that "[n]ot the least reason for difficulty in deter-
mining the nature and source of toxic tort injuries is the fact
that there are approximately 5,000,000 organic chemicals and
500,000 inorganic substances used today, with another 10,000
new chemicals synthesized in the research labs each year, of
which about 1000 enter commerce. "428 Moreover, "[in a stan-
dard accident tort action, the injury, its cause, and its origin
are easy to identify. In the toxic tort arena, the medically di-
agnosed injury is the first in a series of difficult facts to dis-
cover and allege. The latency period associated with many
toxic substance diseases is a major hurdle in the causation
chain.' 24 In reinstating the plaintiff's cause of action, the Vis-
pisiano court concluded that "the courts below attached in-
sufficient weight to the inherent difficulty in diagnosing an in-
jury caused by toxic chemicals as well as in discovering the
cause of such an injury. "425
VI. Product Liability Cases
Nigh v. Dow Chemical Co.421 - a 1986 federal diversity
case lodged in the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Wisconsin - combined factual elements of
both an occupational exposure dispute and a product liability
action. Lawrence Nigh, among other plaintiffs, sought per-
sonal injury damages against manufacturers of liquid grain fu-
migants to which he was exposed while employed at Cargill
Grain Elevator. At trial, Nigh prevailed against two manufac-
turers, Weevil-Cide and Research Products, in the total
422. Id. at 72 (case citations omitted; citing Note, The Fairness and Constitu-
tionality of Statute of Limitations for Toxic Tort Suits, 96 HsAv. L. REV. 1683, 1685
(1983)).
423. Id. at 73 (citing Nothstein, supra note 378, § 1.01).
424. Id. at 73 (quoting Nothstein supra note 378, §§ 4.01, 13.04).
425. Id. at 77.
426. 634 F. Supp. 1513 (W.D. Wis. 1986).
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amount of $104,000. Other plaintiffs recovered nothing; re-
maining defendants, including Dow Chemical Co., were dis-
missed. 42 7 In the course of ruling on the parties' post-trial mo-
tions, the trial court focused on two aspects of chemical
poisoning. Initially, the court rejected the arguments of Wee-
vil-Cide and Research Products in support of their motions
for a judgment n.o.v., that Nigh's injuries were entirely due to
workplace exposures in the 1960s, prior to the time that the
defendants had sold fumigants to Nigh's employer. The court
supported its decision on this point by referring to "second
collision" automobile cases whereby indivisible causation is
attributed to a later tortfeasor.4 28 The court also rejected
Nigh's motion for a new trial as to Dow, basing its conclusion
on a prediction that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin would
adopt the toxic tort "bulk supplier doctrine. ' 42 9 According to
the court's reasoning, while Dow originally manufactured the
fumigant, this product was incorporated into the final product
sold to Nigh's employer under Weevil-Cide's label. The bulk
supplier doctrine, as construed by the court, "is basically a
recognition of the fact that a manufacturer. .. may be unable
to control the packaging, and therefore the warning communi-
cated to the ultimate user, when the labels of an intermediate
seller are affixed to the product. 4 °30 Thus, the court concluded
that "[a] manufacturer who cannot control the content of the
warning past to the ultimate user can hardly be guilty of fail-
ing to exercise ordinary care with respect to such warnings or
of producing an unreasonably dangerous product, the danger-
ousness of which is caused by inadequate warnings that it did
not give and could not improve. "431
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
decided In re Swine Flu Products Liability Litigation3 2 in
1985. Consistent with the holdings of other toxic tort cases
decided during the first part of the 1980s - which had
427. Id. at 1514.
428. Id. at 1515.
429. Id. at 1516 (citing Nothstein, supra note 378, § 14.09).
430. Id.
431. Id. at 1517.
432. 764 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1985).
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crafted accrual rules recognizing the difficulty of plaintiffs
knowing when their latent injuries commenced - the Ninth
Circuit held that a husband's cause of action against the U.S.
Public Health Service accrued at the time when he discov-
ered, or should have discovered, the cause of his wife's death.
In a case involving a husband's wrongful death claim for his
wife's death due to Guillain-Barre Syndrome (GBS), allegedly
contracted from an inoculation for Swine Flu, the court ob-
served the policy for a discovery rule in a statutory tort claim
against the government: "On the date of [the wife's] death the
medical and general communities were still ascertaining
whether a GBS victim even had any rights against the . . .
administrator of the swine flu vaccine. We do not ignore the
traditional concerns that a claim be time-barred when 'evi-
dence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared'. . . . But under the facts, fundamental fairness
concerns must prevail."433
Two federal district court cases decided in 1986 resolved
questions of the use of expert testimony in toxic tort product
liability litigation. Ramirez v. Richardson-Merrell Inc.434 -
another pharmaceutical case - rejected the manufacturer's
motion for summary judgment. The manufacturers' motion
was based on an assertion that plaintiff's proposed expert tes-
timony on the causative link between her mother's ingestion
of the prescription drug Bendectin was inadmissible because
- like the district court's approach in the Agent Orange toxic
tort litigation - "the material upon which plaintiffs' experts"
would base their opinions is inadmissible under Federal Rules
of Evidence 703 and "not of a type reasonably relied on by
433. Id. at 639-40 (citations omitted) (footnote citing The Fairness and Consti-
tutionality of Statute of Limitations for Toxic Tort Suits, supra note 422, at 1684-90
(1983)). Cf. Engel v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1987 WL 4769 (W.D.N.Y.
Apr. 20, 1987) (inapplicability of state toxic tort discovery and retroactivity statute of
limitation to pharmaceutical product liability suit); Greene v. Abbott Lab., 521
N.Y.S.2d 382, 137 Misc. 2d 424 (1987) (partial summary judgment grants to drug
manufacturer where (1) the wrongful death claim "could have been brought" within
the meaning of the exclusion in the toxic tort statutory revival provision and (2) alle-
gations concerning manufacturers' misleading consumers and breaching their duty to
warn of risks associated with DES were insufficient to extend statute of limitations).
434. No. CIV.A.85-1504, 1986 WL 9724 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1986).
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experts in the field."4 85 The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Ramirez, however,
found the defendant's argument unpersuasive because the
Third Circuit had "established a liberal approach to deter-
mining what constitutes evidence reasonably relied upon by
experts."4 8
6
Conversely, in Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co.,437 a herbi-
cide toxic tort dispute, the federal trial court held that sum-
mary judgment should be granted to the herbicide manufac-
turer because the plaintiff's proffered expert testimony was so
lacking in probative weight or value that exclusion was re-
quired. Citing one of Judge Weinstein's opinions applying
Federal Rules of Evidence 703 in the Agent Orange Litiga-
tion,"8 the Viterbo court reasoned that it:
must determine whether the data relied upon by [plain-
tiffs' experts] is of a type reasonably relied upon by ex-
perts in the particular field in forming opinions, or infer-
ences upon a subject. A rigorous examination is
especially important in the toxic tort context, where
presentation to the trier of theories of causation depends
almost entirely upon expert testimony. This examination
is required because courts have afforded experts wide lati-
tude in picking and choosing the sources on which to base
opinions. Rule 703 nonetheless requires courts to examine
the reliability of those sources.4"
In 1987, a New Jersey intermediate appellate court issued
an opinion in Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories.4 4 ° This case in-
volved a suit by a child and her parents against the manufac-
turers of the pertussis antigen component of a diphtheria, per-
435. Id. at *2 (referencing A.O., 611 F. Supp. at 1239 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)). See
supra notes 14 to 147 and accompanying text.
436. 1986 WL 9724 at *2 (citing In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723
F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986)).
437. 646 F. Supp. 1420 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
438. Id. at 1424 (citing A.O., 611 F. Supp. 1223).
439. Id. (citation omitted).
440. 530 A.2d 1287 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987), rev'd, 561 A.2d 511 (N.J.
1989).
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tussis and tetanus toxoid vaccine. The plaintiffs asserted four
legal theories - negligence, breach of warranty, misrepresen-
tation, and strict liability - based on the child's seizure dis-
order in reaction to the vaccine, which led to her chronic en-
cephalopathy and severe mental retardation. In reversing the
trial court's dismissal order, the New Jersey intermediate ap-
pellate court imposed a risk-modified market-share collective
liability standard on the DPT vaccine manufacturers. Citing
the Supreme Court of New Jersey's "recent toxic tort case" in
Ayers v. Jackson Township,441 the appellate court noted in
dictum
that in mass exposure litigation where identification of
the culpable defendant presents a causation problem, re-
sort might be had to the alternative liability theory ex-
pressed in [the Supreme Court of California's decision in]
Summers v. Tice ... a case in which plaintiff could not
prove which defendant was responsible for his injury, and
under those special facts the burden of proof was placed
upon defendants to disprove causation.4 42
On certification to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, how-
ever, the appellate court's decision was reversed on grounds
that imposing collective responsibility on DPT manufacturers
was inappropriate where each manufacturer used a different
manufacturing process and there was no indication of a tacit
common plan to produce the vaccine among the defendants. 443
VII. Insurance Issues
In a few cases decided during the early to mid-1980s,
courts addressed insurance law issues in the context of what
they viewed as toxic tort litigation. For example, in CPS
Chemical Co., Inc. v. Continental Insurance Co.,444 a New
Jersey trial court rendered a summary judgment for an in-
441. Id. at 1298 (citing 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987)).
442. Id. (citing 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948)).
443. 561 A.2d 511 (N.J. 1989).
444. 489 A.2d 1265 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984), rev'd, 495 A.2d 886 (N.J.
1985).
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sured chemical company, which required the insurance com-
pany to provide coverage under comprehensive general liabil-
ity policies. Specifically, the court held that alleged illegal
dumping of wastes by a disposal company hired by the in-
sured chemical company was an "accident" within the gener-
ally accepted definition of that term; that there was an "oc-
currence" within the policy periods, notwithstanding actual
discovery of environmental damage after expiration of the
policy; and, that no exclusions applied to coverage. In the
course of reaching its determination, the court cited an article
on the intersection between toxic tort actions and insurance
coverage, while "recogniz[ing] the considerable controversy re-
specting the date when duty to indemnify is triggered when
long periods of time pass between the initial accident or expo-
sure, manifestation, and ultimate or long-continued dam-
ages. '445 Indeed, this controversy in interpreting the duty led
to a reversal of the court's decision on appeal to the interme-
diate appellate court.44
Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.""' was a factu-
ally similar case to the CPS Chemical case. The federal trial
court in Claussen, however, interpreted the relevant insurance
policies as precluding coverage under general comprehensive
liability policies, because of a pollution exclusion clause con-
tained in each policy. Noting a Harvard Law Review analysis
that discussed "'the sharp increase in environmental litiga-
tion and the court's broad construction of insurance policies
[which] have combined to shock the insurance industry,' ,448
the court went on to construe the relevant insurance policy at
bar. The court emphasized that "[o]nly where the release, es-
cape or dispersal of contaminants is 'sudden and accidental'
would the insurance policies issued by Aetna apply. ' 4 9 Yet,
the facts precluded coverage since plaintiff's "trucks were
pouring toxic waste into . . . [the contaminated area] for ap-
445. Id. at 1269 n.1 (citing, inter alia, Cynthia M. Obremski, Toxic Tort and
Insurance Coverage Controversy, 34 FED'N OF INS. COUNS. Q. 3, 32).
446. 495 A.2d 886 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).
447. 676 F. Supp. 1571 (S.D. Ga. 1987).
448. Id. at 1574 (citing Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1575).
449. Id. at 1579.
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proximately nine years," far from "sudden and accidental. 4 50
In a similar factual context, the federal district court in.
CTS Printex, Inc. v. American Motorists Insurance Co.45 1 in-
terpreted the applicability of an insurance policy to "a series
of toxic tort lawsuits filed against plaintiff. 4 52 Since the
plaintiff's insurance suit, however, alleged wrongful conduct
by a number of unknown parties - designated as "Doe de-
fendants" in the complaint, in addition to wrongful denial of
coverage by the insurance company - the court remanded
the case to state court because the pertinent pleading rules
destroyed federal diversity jurisdiction.
Conclusion
During the time period of 1979-87, American courts in a
wide variety of cases referred to the term "toxic tort" in the
course of their opinions. Starting with the seminal Agent Or-
ange Litigation,53 courts employed "toxic tort" terminology
to discuss a variety of disputes entailing environmental expo-
sure cases, occupational exposure disputes, product liability
actions, and cases involving insurance claims. Moreover, be-
cause of their resolution in the early 1980s and the widely
publicized nature of the underlying facts, toxic tort cases in-
volving Agent Orange, asbestos and atomic radiation received
special emphasis.
During this nascent period of judicial interpretation of
the meaning of toxic tort law, courts made their decisions in a
context characterized by tension between two varying ap-
proaches: the tendency to treat toxic tort cases as involving
just another application of traditional principles of tort law,
on the one hand, and the propensity to use or develop special
rules, principles, or doctrines because of the perceived unique
nature of toxic tort cases, on the other hand. As toxic tort law
continues to develop in the 1990s, it appears unlikely that this
450. Id.
451. 639 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
452. Id. at 1273.
453. See supra notes 14-179 and accompanying text.
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basic jurisprudential tension will be resolved by the courts
anytime soon.
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